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Abstract 
Research in social psychology points to a discontinuity between the individual self and the 
collective self such that operating at the collective level of identity leads one to be more biased, 
defensive, and hostile than when operating at the individual level of identity. One area of 
research where this distinction is particularly apparent is that of identity threat and affirmation 
theory. Although affirming the self has been shown to reduce individual-level biases in the face 
of threat, affirming the group in response to a collective-level threat has been shown to 
accentuate biased tendencies. This may be a result of the inherent inflexibility of the collective 
self. Unlike self-affirmation, group-affirmation may induce a focus on a specific social identity 
and activate the psychological attributes (e.g., attitudes, stereotypes, and norms) pertinent to that 
identity which then guide subsequent thoughts, judgments, motivations, and behaviors. This 
raises the question, if the collective self is construed in this manner, are there certain contexts in 
which affirming the group can in fact lead to a reduction in bias and defensiveness in the face of 
threat? Two potential contexts are addressed in this research: (a) if the threat is to one’s 
individual-level identity (Study 1) and (b) if having unbiased attitudes are a component of the 
affirmed group’s psychological identity (Study 2). Affirming the group did not affect 
participants’ attributional tendencies following a self-threatening task performance. Group-
affirmation did, however, increase positive attitudes towards certain out-groups for low-
identifying group members. Also, unlike affirming the self, affirming the group did not protect 
participants’ self-esteem from either an individual-level threat or a collective-level threat, 
providing further support for the notion that self- and group-affirmation are distinct processes. 
The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.    
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Using Affirmation Theory to Further Understand the Distinction between the Individual Self and 
the Collective Self 
The relationship between the individual self and the collective self is a topic that has 
guided research in the field of social psychology for decades. In fact, Floyd Allport (1962) 
classifies the question of how best to conceptualize the nature of the individual and the group as 
the “master problem of social psychology” (p. 7). Although his analysis primarily refers to 
performance differences in individual and group settings (i.e., social facilitation effects), other 
researchers have reformulated this “problem” as the study of how the self is fundamentally 
defined at the individual and collective levels and the effects that these levels of representation 
have on interindividual and intergroup psychological processes and behavior (Brewer & 
Gardner, 1996). Many lines of research, for instance, seem to demonstrate that there is a 
fundamental distinction between individual-level processes and collective-level processes such 
that, when operating at the collective level of identity, one becomes more biased, hostile, and 
beholden to group-based norms and stereotypes than when operating at the individual level of 
identity (see Wildschut & Insko, 2007; Yzerbyt and Demoulin, 2010)  
One area of research in which this distinction has become particularly manifest is identity 
threat and affirmation theory. Although it has been demonstrated that affirming one’s individual-
level identity can be an effective strategy for reducing defensiveness and hostility in the face of 
self-threats (Sherman & Cohen, 2002), affirming a collective-level identity tends to be 
ineffective at countering group-level threats, sometimes even accentuating intergroup biases and 
hostility (Cehajic-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011; Ehrlich & Gramzow, 
2015). I posit that this distinction occurs because the collective self is inherently less flexible 
than the individual self, thus constraining one’s response to threat at that level of identity. Rather 
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than buffering against the threat, group-affirmation activates the attitudes and biases associated 
with the affirmed group’s identity, often leading to even more defensiveness. One question that 
arises from this perspective is whether there are any instances in which operating at the 
collective level of identity can actually reduce biased tendencies. For instance, under what 
circumstances might the group-level mind-set inspired by group-affirmation lead one to become 
less defensive, biased, and hostile in the face of threatening information? This question is 
explored in two studies. First, the effect of group-affirmation on the tendency to engage in 
individual-level biases in response to a self-threat is tested. Then, the question of whether 
affirming a group membership can lead to a reduction in bias at the collective level of identity is 
assessed in a specific context: namely, when being unbiased (e.g., having favorable attitudes 
towards certain out-groups) is a part of the affirmed group’s psychological identity.  
The Individual Self and the Collective Self 
When people engage with their social world, they act not just as individuals, but also as 
members of collectives with shared identities, goals, and perceptions (Abrams & Hogg, 2004). 
Social identity theorists (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1984) define the collective self (social identity) as 
the aspects of a person’s self-concept that are derived from his/her membership in various 
groups. In contrast, one’s individual self (personal identity) is composed of the idiosyncratic 
components of the self that differentiate oneself from other specific individuals (Brewer, 1991). 
SIT was formulated to explain the processes underlying intergroup behavior and is based on the 
notion that people continually strive to enhance or maintain positive self-images and, further, 
that group memberships are often central and important components of the self-concept (Tropp 
& Wright, 2001). Group members receive both material and psychological support from the in-
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group (e.g., a sense of security and belonging), and these resources contribute to an individual’s 
overall sense of self-worth (Correll & Park, 2005).  
The theoretical relationship between one’s personal and social identities was elaborated 
on by Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell (1987) in their development of self-
categorization theory (SCT). SCT posits that the self can be categorized at different levels of 
abstraction, and that it is the social context that determines the level that is most salient at any 
given time. These levels range from the self as a unique individual to the self as the embodiment 
of an important in-group. When one’s individual identity is salient, personal needs, motives, and 
beliefs drive behavior. When a social identity is salient, a process of depersonalization occurs in 
which people begin to see themselves as “interchangeable exemplars” of their social category, 
and collective needs, motives, and beliefs become primary. It is at this social level of identity 
that group processes emerge (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). Brewer and Gardner 
(1996) further explore the nature of these levels of identity or “self-representations,” and argue 
that, when operating at the individual level, people tend to define themselves in terms of unique 
personal traits and use other in-group members as the basis for social comparison processes. 
When operating at the collective level, on the other hand, people define themselves in 
accordance with group prototypes and use intergroup differences as the basis for social 
comparison. Furthermore, shifting between levels of self-representation is a fluid and dynamic 
process, and people can readily alternate between operating as an individual and operating as a 
group member depending on the current social context.    
Although the study of the collective self and intergroup processes requires a different 
level of explanation than the study of the personal self and interindividual processes (Hogg, 
2003), it is often implied in the reasoning of social identity theorists that the psychological 
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processes taking place at these two levels of identity should be similar and operate in a parallel 
fashion. In fact, Turner et al. (1994) state that the personal self and the collective self “arise from 
the same general processes, and both are aspects of the normal variation of the self, a variation 
built into its function (p. 460). For these researchers, the personal self and the collective self 
represent the opposing ends of a “functionally antagonistic” continuum. In other words, as one’s 
identification with a group becomes more and more salient, a corresponding functional decrease 
in the salience of one’s personal self and its associated attributes takes place (and vice-versa). 
The essential differences, then, between these two ends of the continuum are (a) what constitutes 
“the self” (the individual versus a group prototype), (b) one’s frame of reference (interpersonal 
versus intergroup comparisons), and (c) one’s basic social motivation (self-interest versus 
collective interest) (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Thus, according to this theoretical perspective, the 
psychological processes themselves that occur at the individual level and collective level should 
be similar. 
This mind-set is echoed by researchers who have taken certain psychological constructs 
traditionally studied at the individual level of identity and applied them to the collective level. 
Luhtanen and Crocker (1992), for instance, developed a measure of collective self-esteem in an 
effort to extend this individual-based personality variable to the collective level of identity. They 
argue that, just as personal self-esteem is enhanced by making positive interpersonal 
comparisons and engaging in positive biases that favor the self (Taylor & Brown, 1988), 
collective self-esteem can be enhanced through positive intergroup comparisons (Crocker, Blain, 
& Luhtanen, 1993). A similar extension has recently been put forth for the construct of 
narcissism. Collective narcissism refers to an “emotional investment in an unrealistic belief 
about the unparalleled greatness of an in-group” (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, and 
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Jayawickreme (2009) p. 1074). Thus, collective narcissism is essentially an extension of the 
narcissistic trait to the collective level of identity in that it involves idealizing an in-group rather 
than the individual self. Additionally, similar relationships between narcissism and other 
personality traits, such as aggressiveness, have been shown to emerge at the individual and 
collective levels of identity. For example, as is the case with narcissism and individual-level 
threats, collective narcissism coupled with a threat to the in-group has been shown to produce 
aggressive, hostile, and derogatory reactions directed towards the group responsible for the threat 
(Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013).   
In addition to trait-level variables, researchers have begun to explore the applicability of 
various emotional processes typically analyzed at the individual and interpersonal level to that of 
the collective. For example, there is growing evidence that people can experience self-conscious 
emotions such as guilt and shame when operating as a group member (as opposed to as an 
individual). In other words, they report experiencing these emotions in response to acts 
committed (either in the past or present) by members of groups to which they belong even if they 
personally did not participate in such behavior (Tangney & Tracy, 2012). Furthermore, the 
factors that affect the experiencing of these collective emotions seem to parallel those that affect 
the experiencing of those emotions at the individual level (Allpress, Brown, Giner-Sorolla, 
Deonna, and Teroni, 2014). As is the case with interpersonal guilt, for instance, feelings of 
collective guilt stem from the committing of harmful acts perceived to be unjustified or 
illegitimate (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002).  
A Discontinuity between the Individual Self and Collective Self 
Despite the growing trend in the literature to take individual-level psychological 
constructs and apply them in a parallel fashion to the collective level of identity, I argue that this 
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transfer of process is not as clear-cut as some have posited (see Turner et al., 1994). Indeed, 
many lines of research in social psychology point to a fundamental distinction in how people 
think, feel, and behave when operating at the collective as opposed to the individual level of 
identity. In general, these lines of research indicate that a group-level mind-set seems to result in 
more aggressive and defensive responding and greater adherence to group-based norms and 
biases than an individual-level mind-set. Research on the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity 
effect, for instance, reveals that there is a tendency for people to behave in a more competitive 
(and less cooperative) fashion when in intergroup situations than when in interpersonal situations 
(Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, & Graetz, 1990). Using laboratory-based mixed-motive games 
such as the prisoner’s dilemma, researchers have discovered a distinct pattern such that 
participants tend to adopt more cooperative strategies and use more cooperative language when 
involved in one-on-one interactions than when the interactions involve groups of two or more 
(Insko et al., 1994). In fact, the number of people in each group has not been found to be a 
powerful determinant in the competitiveness of the behavior. The primary distinction comes 
when an interaction between individuals is compared to an interaction between groups, no matter 
the size (Schopler & Insko, 1992). The explanation for this effect which seems to have gained 
the most traction states that people are more prone to feelings of fear and greed when operating 
as a group member than when operating as an individual (Wildschut & Insko, 2007). This is 
attributed to the inherent sense of distrust that people tend to experience in intergroup situations, 
as well as to the influence of such depersonalizing factors as individual anonymity and adherence 
to in-group norms which foster antisocial tendencies.  
 Research from the perspective of appraisal theory and intergroup emotions (Smith, 1993) 
also emphasizes a discontinuity in terms of how people process their social environments at the 
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individual and collective levels of identity. Essentially, when operating as an individual, 
situations are appraised in terms of their relevance to one’s personal interests, whereas when 
operating as a group member, situations are appraised in terms of their relevance to the in-group 
as a whole. Thus, when a group identity is salient, people use it as a filter through which they 
assess the situation, react emotionally to it, and decide on a course of action. In their analysis, 
Yzerbyt and Demoulin (2010) argue that there is often a contrast in how these emotional 
appraisals affect one’s behavior. When operating at the personal level, they argue, individual 
emotional reactions to an event or situation shape behavior and attitudes. In contrast, when 
operating at the collective level, “people’s beliefs and actions are aligned with their 
understanding of those features that define their group as opposed to a salient outgroup” (p. 
1048). Thus, the inherent comparative nature of the collective level of analysis has an indelible 
influence on how one interprets information and experiences a situation. For example, when 
asked to indicate their emotional reactions to out-group members as individuals, people’s ratings 
tend to be quite varied (containing both positive and negative elements) and based on their 
individual experiences and encounters with members of those groups (Dijker, Koomen, van den 
Heuvel, & Frijda, 1996). Conversely, when a specific social identity is made salient, people tend 
to appraise out-group members in terms of the content and characteristics associated with that 
particular intergroup relationship (e.g., differences in core values and perceived power dynamics) 
which often translate to negative attitudes and anti-social behavioral intentions towards out-
groups (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008).  
The distinction between individual and group-level processes is also emphasized by 
Brewer (1998) in her model of social categorization and person perception. She argues that, 
although social categorization, in general, is a process of partitioning “the multidimensional 
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variability among human begins into discrete subsets, accompanied by accentuation of perceived 
intracategory similarities and intercategory differences” (p. 695), distinct factors come into play 
when that categorization process involves social identities to which one belongs. She thus 
differentiates between “hot cognition” and “cold cognition” based on whether the in-group, and 
all its associated emotional significance, is involved in the person perception process. In cases of 
cold cognition, social categorization and differentiation occur when category prototypes, 
perceived trait distributions, and notions of the social meaning of categories are assigned based 
on experience and social learning, devoid of reference to the self-concept or any in-group. 
However, when the elements of self-referencing and social comparison become involved, and in-
group-out-group differentiation occurs alongside categorization, cognition becomes “hot” and 
biased into “us-not us” terms based on the stereotypes and biases associated with one’s salient 
social identity. Thus, categorizing at the level of the collective tends to result in more bias and 
hostility than categorizing at the level of the individual.   
Self-Affirmation and Group-Affirmation 
One area of research in which the distinction between the individual and collective selves 
has received more recent attention is that of identity threat and affirmation. According to self-
affirmation theory, people can counter threats to the individual-level self-concept and maintain a 
sense of integrity by affirming a valued domain of the self that is unrelated to the threat (Spencer, 
Fein, & Lomore, 2001; Steele, 1988). This can be accomplished, for example, by reflecting on a 
positive aspect of one’s self-concept or engaging in an activity that makes such an aspect salient, 
such as writing about an important self-relevant value (Crocker, Niiya, & Mischkowski 2008). 
While doing this, individuals experience a boost to their self-worth and become more confident 
and secure, enabling them to evaluate potentially self-threatening information in a less defensive 
       9 
 
and biased manner. For example, people tend to interpret ambiguous self-relevant information in 
a manner that is consistent with their preexisting beliefs and desires (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). 
After affirming the self, however, people are more likely to consider evidence that contradicts 
their own beliefs or view an issue from perspectives other than their own (Sherman & Cohen, 
2002). This self-affirmation effect extends to group-based threats and biases. If the motivation to 
protect the self is satisfied through self-affirmation, one can respond to information and threats 
relevant to one’s group memberships (other domains of the self) in a more objective way, thus 
making the group-serving biases normally exhibited following a threat less necessary. This bias-
reducing pattern has been found in several group-based contexts, including group-serving 
attributions made by intramural sports teams (Sherman & Kim, 2005), perceptions of racism 
exhibited by in-group members (Adams, Tormala, & O’Brien, 2006), and self-reported ethnic 
prejudice (Zarate & Garza, 2002).   
Because a plethora of studies have shown that affirming the self at the individual level 
can bolster the self-concept, reduce defensiveness, and mitigate self-serving biases (see 
McQueen & Klein, 2006), it has been posited that one should similarly be able to counter threats 
to one’s social identity and mitigate collective-level biases by affirming that group identity (such 
as reflecting on a value important to that group; Sherman, Kinias, Major, Kim, & Prenovost, 
2007). Additionally, Derks, van Laar, and Ellemers (2009) argue that, to the extent that one’s 
personal identity and social identity overlap and are highly connected, it could be reasoned that 
group-affirmation should be just as effective at countering group-related threats as is self-
affirmation. Thus, it might be expected that affirming a group identity will bolster one’s sense of 
self-integrity, making one more open to possible group-threatening information and mitigating 
the need to make group-serving judgments. Such an effect has not been produced consistently, 
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however. Although Gunn and Wilson (2011) did find that men (Experiment 1) and Canadians 
(Experiment 2) who performed a group-affirmation task were more willing to express feelings of 
collective guilt and shame after reading about historical in-group transgressions against women 
and Canadian Aboriginals, respectively, the bias-reducing effect of group-affirmation has not 
been reproduced in different contexts. Cehajic-Clancy et al. (2011), for instance, found that 
Israeli students who performed a self-affirmation task were more willing to express group-based 
guilt, acknowledge responsibility for wrongdoing, and support reparative measures with respect 
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Students who performed a group-affirmation task, however, 
did not show this reparatory shift and continued to demonstrate a significant bias favoring the in-
group.  
In fact, some empirical findings seem to indicate that affirming a social identity can even 
exacerbate the tendency to exhibit group-level biases. Glasford, Dovidio, and Pratto (2009) 
found that students who were given the opportunity to affirm their American identities showed 
no increase in collective guilt after reading a report describing a bombing run made by American 
soldiers in which many foreign civilians were killed. Additionally, participants who affirmed 
their nationality exhibited less psychological discomfort after reading the report than did those 
who did not group-affirm, and this pattern was especially strong for those highly identified with 
their nationality. The authors explain this decrease in psychological discomfort following group-
affirmation as a reduction in “intragroup dissonance.” This finding also suggests an increased 
willingness to tolerate in-group transgressions (and thus a greater tendency to exhibit biases 
favoring the in-group) among the group-affirmed. Additionally, I have found in my own research 
that affirming one’s political identity not only fails to reduce group-level political biases, but 
even intensifies them (thus having the opposite effect of self-affirmation; Ehrlich & Gramzow, 
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2015). Specifically, I found that participants tended to evaluate members of the opposing 
political party more negatively than they evaluated members of their own party. This group-
serving evaluative bias was magnified when participants first affirmed a value endorsed by the 
group (i.e., group-affirmation) compared to when they endorsed a personally held value (i.e., 
self-affirmation). Thus, rather than behaving in a concurrent fashion, self- and group-affirmation 
seem to have distinct effects on how one responds to identity threats such that affirming the 
collective self can lead to greater defensiveness and the strengthening of in-group biases.  
Affirmation Processes and the Nature of the Individual and Collective Selves   
Along with research on the discontinuity effect, intergroup appraisals and social 
categorization, I posit that the distinction between self- and group-affirmation effects reflect a 
fundamental difference between the nature of the individual and collective selves. Structurally, 
the individual self-concept is generally presented as being composed of a set of basic-level “self-
aspects” encompassing various attributes, emotional states, roles, activities, and relationships 
(Markus & Wurf, 1987; Oyserman, Elmore, & Smith, 2012). The individual self is thus 
“inherently flexible in content and organization” (DeSteno and Salovey, 1997, p. 396) with the 
activation of one’s various attributes and roles being dependent upon one’s social context. 
Markus and Wurf use the example of having multiple tennis-related selves. Some situations, 
such as playing tennis against a friend, may activate one’s “good sport self,” whereas other 
contexts, such as playing in a competitive tournament, may activate one’s “win at all costs self.” 
Thus, the structure of the individual self lends itself to flexibility and malleability in terms of 
content and process.   
The structure of the collective self, on the other hand, is more ambiguous. Brewer (1991), 
for instance, refers to the collective self and social identity as simply an “extension of the self 
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beyond the level of the individual” (p. 476). Other researchers seem to fold specific group 
memberships into the same category as social roles and thus present social identities as relational 
aspects of the individual self-concept (e.g., McConnell, 2011). I suggest that the collective self 
can be construed as more or less a combination of those two ideas. Rather than as role-based 
components of one’s individual-level self, one’s multiple social identities can be conceived of as 
independent (although sometimes overlapping) branches extending out from one’s overall self-
concept. When one group membership, or “branch,” becomes salient, one is more likely to think 
and behave in line with the attributes and guiding norms of that group (and intergroup situations 
in general). This notion fits in with the logic of Simon (1997) who posits that the individual self 
and the collective self differ in terms of the number of self-aspects that compose each of those 
selves. Whereas the collective self consists of one single, dominant self-aspect, the individual 
self is based on a comprehensive, non-redundant set of one’s total self-aspects. Additionally, 
research by Lowell Gaertner and colleagues (Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea, & Iuzzini, 2002; 
Sedikides, Gaertner, Luke, O’Mara, & Gebauer, 2013) has shown that the individual self can be 
characterized as being “primary” as compared to the collective self (such that people tend to 
think more deeply about the individual self and defend and enhance it to a greater degree than 
the collective self). If the individual self is indeed one’s “psychological home base,” then it 
makes sense that it would be more complex and flexible than the individual branches 
representing various collective identities.  
Conceptualizing the collective self in this manner implies that, when operating as a group 
member, one can become constrained by the norms and biases associated with that particular 
social identity, thus limiting one’s cognitive, affective, and behavioral flexibility. When 
operating as an individual, on the other hand, the self-concept is more malleable as one can 
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experience and respond to his/her social environment independent of any group-based frame. 
The rigidity which characterizes psychological processing at the collective level of identity is 
manifested in the findings discussed earlier with respect to self- and group-affirmation. A self-
affirmation manipulation may provide a boost to the self by inducing a focus on positive aspects 
of one’s global (individual-level) sense of self, or “overall self-concept of worth” (Steele, 1988, 
p. 266), thus making aspects of the self that are related to certain group memberships less salient 
and mitigating the need to defend those identities. In fact, Critcher and Dunning (2015) 
demonstrate that affirming the self reduces defensiveness in the face of threat precisely because 
it expands the working self-concept, takes advantage of the flexible nature of the individual self, 
and directs attention away from the threatened domain.  
On the other hand, it is possible that affirming the group does not produce the consistent, 
bias-reducing effect that affirming the self does because group-affirmation induces a focus on a 
specific social identity and activates the psychological attributes (e.g., attitudes, stereotypes, 
norms, behavioral tendencies, intergroup comparisons) pertinent to that identity. Once activated, 
this group-specific mindset guides subsequent thoughts, judgments, motivations, and behaviors. 
A by-product of this mindset would be an increase in biases that serve to establish, protect, and 
enhance the worth and integrity of the in-group. Thus, when the individual self is threatened in a 
specific domain, one can address that threat directly (such as by psychologically devaluing the 
importance of that domain) or indirectly by focusing on positive aspects of the self in other 
domains. At the collective level, however, this malleability may not be possible, resulting in 
greater defensiveness, competitiveness and adherence to group norms.   
Furthermore, the distinct processes underlying self- and group-affirmation point to a 
larger psychological domain in which the enhanced flexibility of the individual self in 
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comparison to the collective self is especially evident: self-protection strategies and threat 
response. When one’s self-concept is threatened or devalued at either the individual level or the 
collective level, one becomes motivated to protect the self and engage in “affective, cognitive, 
and behavioral strivings that counteract threat, aiming to reestablish equanimity” (Sedikides, 
2012, p. 328). At the individual level of identity, self-protection can take a multitude of forms. 
For instance, one can address the threat directly by altering how the threat (or the presumed 
implications of the threat) is construed (Campbell, Sedikides, Reeder, & Elliot, 2000), derogating 
or rejecting the source of the threat (Bourgeois & Leary, 2001), or shifting social comparison 
strategies to make oneself appear more favorable (Jordan & Monin, 2008). One can also protect 
the self through more indirect methods. These may include affirming the self-concept in a 
domain unrelated to the threat (as previously discussed), disengaging from a particularly 
threatening context (Leitner, Hehman, Deegan, & Jones, 2014), or strategically forgetting 
potentially self-threatening information (Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011). Thus, people can be 
quite flexible in terms of how they react to individual-level threats to their self-concepts and self-
affirmation is one manifestation of that flexibility.   
Although self-protection is a malleable process when operating at the individual level of 
identity, potential responses to group-level threats tend to be constrained by the group-based 
norms and intergroup comparisons relevant to the threatened social identity. Hogg (2003) argues 
that social identities acquire meaning because in-groups are different from, and compared 
against, out-groups (although see Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt, & Orina, 2006). Because of this, any 
sort of threat response or group-enhancing strategy (such as group-affirmation) is inherently 
based on this intergroup comparison process. Additionally, when identifying as a group member, 
“a person is influenced by group norms, behaves in line with those norms, and shares the 
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concerns and interests of the group” (Abrams & Hogg, 2004). Thus, one’s response to group-
level threats will be constrained by the norms associated with that group. This limits the number 
of strategies one can use when countering threats at the intergroup level. For example, Ellemers 
and van Rijswijk (1997) posit that one can use either an “individual-level” or a “group-level” 
identity management strategy when confronted with a threat to one’s social identity. Essentially, 
they argue that one can either leave the threatened group (physically or psychologically) or 
engage in cognitive and behavioral processes “aimed at challenging the source of the threat and 
changing the present status configuration insofar as it is unfavorable to the in-group” (Ellemers, 
Spears, and Doosje, 2002, p. 176). Thus, when one affirms a collective identity in response to 
group-level threat, he/she is simply reinforcing the norms and intergroup comparisons associated 
with that group, making it even more likely he/she will challenge the threat by becoming more 
defensive and biased.  
The Current Research 
Research on the distinction between the individual and collective selves, particularly 
within the context of affirmation theory, suggests that, because of its inherent inflexibility, 
operating at the collective level of identity generally leads to the expression of thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors that are defensive, biased, and even hostile in nature. Indeed, there is a substantial 
dearth of research touting the positive effects a group-level mind-set can have on one’s attitudes 
and behaviors. This raises the question of whether there are certain situations in which operating 
at the collective level of identity can, in fact, reduce, rather than exacerbate, biased tendencies. 
With respect to affirmation theory, are there contexts in which affirming the group can “work” 
such that it leads to a reduction in defensiveness and bias as does self-affirmation?  
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The current research explores two scenarios in which affirming one’s collective identity 
may buffer against threat and reduce defensiveness. The first is if the threat occurs at the 
individual level of identity. Just as affirming an aspect of the individual self can decrease bias 
following a threat to one’s collective identity (Ehrlich & Gramzow, 2015; Sherman & Kim, 
2005), perhaps affirming an aspect of the collective self can reduce bias following a threat to 
one’s personal identity. In this context, the sense of belonging and other social resources (Correll 
& Park, 2005) one receives from his/her group membership can be used to bolster one’s feelings 
of self-worth in the face of the individual-level threat (Shnabel, Purdie-Vaughns, Cook, Garcia, 
& Cohen, 2013). Additionally, because there is no intergroup comparison process taking place at 
the individual level of identity, any attitudes and biases that affirming the group might activate 
are not likely to be relevant at that level. However, there is also research which suggests that 
affirming the group may not be an effective way to reduce individual-level biases. Work on the 
motivational primacy of the individual self (Gaertner et al., 2002; Sedikides et al., 2013), for 
instance, suggests that people are more reactive to threats and enhancements of the individual 
self than the collective self. Thus, a group-affirmation may not be potent enough to bolster the 
self in response to an individual-level threat. This question is explored in Study 1, which tests if 
affirming one’s collective identity (in comparison to one’s personal identity) provides a boost to 
the self-concept and reduces the tendency to make self-serving attributional biases following a 
poor performance on an intelligence task.   
A second scenario in which affirming the group may have a bias-reducing effect is if 
being unbiased is a part of the affirmed group’s psychological identity. For instance, one may be 
a part of a group in which it is the norm to have favorable, unbiased attitudes towards certain 
out-groups. Thus, affirming that collective identity following a threat may activate those 
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favorable attitudes and reduce bias towards members of those groups. Some tangential evidence 
for this argument can be found in previous research. For example, the Israeli students in Cehajic-
Clancy et al. (2011)’s study who affirmed their nationality may have shown no increase in 
collective guilt or responsibility because the biases and motives associated with their collective 
identities as “Israelis” had become more salient (presuming that, given the historical and ongoing 
intergroup tension, Israelis and Palestinians are not “supposed” to feel guilty or responsible for 
the suffering of the other group). On the other hand, Gunn and Wilson (2011) may have found an 
increase in feelings of collective guilt and shame for an in-group’s historical mistreatment of an 
out-group (men’s mistreatment of women and Canadians’ mistreatment of aboriginal tribes) after 
group-affirmation because that type of behavior is no longer considered socially acceptable. 
Thus, one’s “male” and “Canadian” identities may contain the sentiment that mistreatment of 
women and aboriginals, respectively, is wrong and that guilt and shame are the proper emotions 
to exhibit towards such transgressions. Study 2 tests this hypothesis directly and assesses 
whether affirming one’s political identity can simultaneously decrease biased attitudes towards 
those out-groups one’s political party considers favorable and increase biased attitudes towards 
groups considered unfavorable.  
In addition to being the first known studies to directly test the effects of group-
affirmation on defensiveness and bias in these two scenarios, this research also seeks to address 
two other theoretical issues relevant to the affirmation process. The first issue is the relationship 
between identity affirmation and self-esteem. Self-esteem is rarely mentioned directly in research 
on affirmation theory. Rather, self-affirmation is characterized as boosting one’s “sense of self-
integrity” (Steele, 1988) or “general feelings of worth” (Sherman et al., 2007). It is unclear 
whether these descriptions refer to self-esteem or to a more abstract self-evaluative construct. 
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Generally, when self-esteem is included in a study on affirmation theory, it is conceptualized as a 
categorical moderator of affirmation effects (see McQueen and Klein, 2006). Very little work 
has tested whether affirming the self (or affirming the group) can protect one’s self-esteem in the 
face of identity threats. Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, and Dijksterhuis (1999) did find that 
affirming the self reduced ruminative tendencies and led to more positive name-letter evaluations 
(a general measure of self-worth) following a self-threat. More recently, Spencer-Rogers, Major, 
Forster, and Peng (2016) found that identity affirmation bolstered self-esteem following a threat 
to participants’ gender identities. The current studies test whether affirming the self and 
affirming the group can boost self-esteem following both an individual-level threat (Study 1) and 
a collective-level threat (Study 2). 
The second issue relates to the timing of the affirmation manipulation. There is some 
ambiguity in the literature regarding whether people should be affirmed before or after a threat in 
order to effectively bolster the self-concept and reduce defensiveness. Because positive 
affirmation results have been reported in both scenarios, McQueen and Klein (2006) conclude 
that the timing of the affirmation is not a pertinent factor when it comes to assessing its 
effectiveness, especially considering the quickness with which experimental protocols proceed in 
most laboratory settings. More recent research by Critcher, Dunning, and Armor (2010), 
however, suggests that affirmation manipulations are most effective when they precede the threat 
(or at least precede the defensive conclusion that results from a threat). In the current research, 
the presentation order of threat and affirmation were counterbalanced to assess if this variable 
moderates the effectiveness of the manipulation.    
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STUDY 1 
Study 1 serves as an initial test of whether affirming the collective self can bolster the 
self-concept and reduce bias in the face of a threat to the individual self. Specifically, it examines 
the effects of both self-affirmation and group-affirmation on the tendency of participants to 
respond defensively to poor performances on a word association test. It also directly tests the 
impact of self- and group-affirmation on participants’ self-esteem following this individual-level 
threat.  
Defensiveness in the context of task performance can be conceptualized in several ways.  
One way is through the expression of self-serving attributional biases. People tend to make self-
serving causal attributions for success and failure, such that when they succeed or perform well, 
they attribute their performances to internal causes, whereas when they fail or perform poorly, 
they attribute the outcome to external factors not under their control (Campbell & Sedikides, 
1999). For example, following a poor task performance, people are more likely to attribute that 
performance to factors such as luck and task difficulty than to factors such as their own 
individual ability and effort (Snyder, Stephan, & Rosenfield, 1976). Defensiveness can also be 
conceptualized as the extent to which an individual “disengages” him/herself from the poor task 
performance. When feeling defensive after a threat, people tend to distance themselves from the 
threatening domain and report that performing well on such tasks is not an important component 
of who they are as individuals (Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998). Finally, 
poor task performance can result in the experience of defensive mental states. “Challenge” and 
“threat,” for instance, are motivational states that reflect one’s perceptions of situational demands 
and personal resources in a given evaluative context (Blascovich & Mendes, 2000; Blascovich, 
Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001). When an individual perceives demands as 
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outweighing resources, a threat experience results, whereas when personal resources meet or 
exceed situational demands, a challenge experience results. Thus, when feeling defensive, 
individuals may experience more threat-related motivations and less challenge-related 
motivations. The current study assesses whether self-affirmation and group-affirmation can 
mitigate these defensive response tendencies. 
 Group-Affirmation Selection Process 
The specific social identities to be affirmed in Study 1 were determined, in part, by the 
results of a pilot study in which undergraduate students from a participant pool were asked to 
indicate the most important groups to which they belonged. The results revealed that political 
party membership was the social identity selected most frequently behind only athletic team 
affiliation. Given the accessibility of political partisans on a college campus and the applicability 
of political affiliation to a broad range of people (as opposed to identification with a particular 
team or sport), political identity was selected as a group-affirmation context.  
However, it could be argued that political affiliation is a unique social identity such that it 
is, by its very nature, divisive and bias-ridden (Ware, 2011). In fact, just the act of thinking about 
politics has been shown to increase peoples’ feelings of threat, hostility, and defensiveness 
(Ehrlich & Gramzow, 2015). It is quite possible, then, that affirming a political identity may 
behave differently from affirming other more “neutral” social identities. Because of this, a 
second group identity was introduced into the Study 1 protocol to ascertain if any potential 
group-affirmation effects are due to the nature of the group being affirmed or to the group-
affirmation process more generally. The second social identity selected was national identity 
(e.g., “American”). The purpose of selecting this identity was to use a group membership that a 
wide range of participants would be able to identify with, but one that would not necessarily 
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have the potential to activate the hostility and bias so characteristic of the political context. Thus, 
participants in Study 1 completed either a self-affirmation task, a political party-affirmation task, 
a nationality-affirmation task, or a non-affirming control task. 
Hypotheses  
Based on previous research documenting a reduction in defensiveness following self-
affirmation (e.g., Sherman & Cohen, 2002), it was hypothesized that participants who affirmed 
the individual self would be less likely to make defensive attributions for their poor 
performances on a word association task than participants who did not affirm at all. Specifically, 
it was predicted that self-affirmation would increase the tendency of participants to attribute their 
performances to the internal factors of individual ability and effort and decrease their tendency to 
attribute performances to the external factors of luck and task difficulty. Additionally, it was 
hypothesized that participants who affirmed the self would experience less threat-related 
emotions and more challenge-related emotions following the threat, report more engagement 
with the task domain, and demonstrate higher levels of self-esteem (a boost to their overall 
feelings of self-worth), relative to those who did not affirm.  
Due to the lack of research exploring the link between group-affirmation and individual-
level processes, no specific hypotheses were made regarding the effects of group-affirmation on 
performance attributions, challenge/threat, task engagement, and self-esteem. Based, on the “in-
group as a social resource” model (Correll & Park, 2005), it could be predicted that affirming the 
group might behave in a similar fashion as affirming the self with respect to individual level 
biases. However, because the collective self is not primary (Gaertner et al., 2002), group-
affirmation may not be as effective as affirming the self at countering individual-level threats.  
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Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of 415 undergraduate students in an introductory psychology course received 
partial course credit for participating in this study. The sample consisted of 262 women and 153 
men aged 18 to 30 (M = 18.64, SD = 1.13). In terms of race/ethnicity, 76.4% of the sample 
identified as White, 8.9% as Asian, 5.3% as Black, 5.1% as Hispanic, 0.5% as Native American, 
and 0.5% as Pacific Islander. Another 3.1% identified as another race or as mixed race. Nearly 
all participants spoke English as a first language (95.3%).1   
Participants were randomly assigned to either the self-affirmation, nationality-
affirmation, political party-affirmation, or non-affirmation (control) condition. This resulted in 
104 participants being assigned to the self-affirmation condition, 105 participants to the 
nationality-affirmation condition, 104 to the political party-affirmation condition, and 102 to the 
non-affirmation condition. Sample size was determined using the general guideline of 100 
participants per condition/cell, which results in 80% power to detect an effect size of d = .40 (the 
average effect size in social/personality psychology; see Funder et al., 2014).   
Procedure and Measures 
Participants completed an online questionnaire containing four sections. The first section 
consisted of informed consent and general demographic questions. The second section consisted 
of the affirmation manipulation. The third section consisted of the word-association task and 
self-threatening feedback, and the fourth section consisted of the reaction and attribution 
measures. These sections are described below. 
Importantly, the presentation order of the affirmation manipulation task and the self-
threatening task (the second and third sections) was counterbalanced across participants.  
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Affirmation Manipulation. Participants in the self-affirmation condition and the two 
group-affirmation conditions completed the standard values-affirmation task adapted from 
previous research (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Fein & Spencer, 1997; Gunn & Wilson, 
2011). Participants were presented with 13 values (e.g., “Art/music,” “Social life,” “Concern for 
others”). Participants in the self-affirmation condition were asked to select the value that they 
thought was most important to them as individuals and to write a paragraph explaining how that 
value pertained to them and why they thought it was so important. Participants in the group-
affirmation conditions were asked to select the value that they thought was most important to 
either their nationality or political party as a group. They were then instructed to write a 
paragraph explaining how that value pertained to their group and why members of that group 
thought it was important. Participants in the non-affirmation (control) condition were asked to 
list everything they had eaten or drank in the previous 48 hours. The non-affirmation instructions 
were taken from Cohen et al., who argue that participants can turn any values-based task (such as 
writing about an un-important value) into a self-affirming task and, thus, something completely 
irrelevant and arbitrary should be used as a control. The full text of the affirmation manipulation 
can be found in Appendix A. 
Self-Threatening Task. All participants completed a difficult version of the Remote 
Associates Test (RAT; McFarlin & Blascovich, 1984), which is a word association task 
consisting of ten trials. For each trial, participants were presented with a series of three stimulus 
words and asked to think of a fourth word that, when combined with each of the stimulus words, 
resulted in word pairs that made up common compound words or phrases. In one trial, for 
example, participants were presented with the words “reading,” “service,” and “stick.” The 
correct answer for this item was “lip” because it could have been combined with each of the 
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stimulus words to create a new compound word/phrase (“lip reading,” “lip service,” and 
“lipstick”). Instructions for the RAT and all items that were used can be found in Appendix B. 
After completing all ten trials, participants were given their actual scores on the test (e.g., “You 
got three out of ten questions correct”).  
Because of the difficulty of the RAT (and anticipated poor performance of the 
participants), the process of completing the test and receiving performance feedback was 
intended to be a source of threat.2 This task was selected specifically because it allowed 
participants’ self-concepts to be threatened without any deception or presentation of 
misinformation (as the performance feedback was accurate). The RAT used in this study was 
compiled by selecting three items categorized as easy and seven items categorized as difficult by 
McFarlan and Blascovich (1984). This was done to prevent participants from being completely 
overwhelmed by the difficulty of the task (as would likely be the case if all ten of the items were 
categorized as difficult).  
Dependent Measures. Following the affirmation procedure and self-threatening task, all 
participants completed a series of dependent measures assessing their reactions to the RAT. One 
set of dependent measures assessed participants’ task performance attributions. Specifically, 
participants were presented with four possible causes that may have contributed to their 
performance on the RAT: Their effort, their ability, luck, and the difficulty of the task (see 
Snyder, Stephan, & Rosenfield, 1976). They then ranked these factors in the order in which they 
thought they had a significant impact on their performance (with a value of 1 being assigned to 
the most impactful factor and a value of 4 being assigned to the least impactful factor). 
Additionally, each of these primary factors was broken down into two separate unipolar sub-
factors, resulting in eight attributional items (“Good luck,” “Bad luck,” “The task being easy,” 
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“The task being difficult,” “Ability to do well,” “Inability to do well,” “Putting in a lot of effort,” 
“Not putting in a lot of effort”). On a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so), participants were 
asked to indicate the extent to which they thought that their performance was determined by each 
of these sub-factors.  
Participants also completed a series of measures assessing their emotional reactions, 
engagement with the task domain, and state self-esteem following the RAT. Emotional reactions 
were assessed with a measure of participants’ experiences of challenge- and threat-related 
emotions (see Blascovich et al., 2001). Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they felt three emotions related to a challenge motivational state (“Eager,” “Hopeful,” “Excited”) 
and three emotions related to a threat motivational state (“Fearful,” “Worried,” “Anxious”) on a 
scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Participants’ responses for the challenge emotions and 
threat emotions were averaged to produce one overall challenge variable (α = .74) and one 
overall threat variable (α = .82).     
Engagement with the task domain was assessed with the disengagement subscale of the 
Intellectual Orientation Inventory (IOI; Major et al., 1998) which is a six-item measure assessing 
the extent to which people disengage themselves from negative feedback on intelligence tests. 
On a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so), participants indicated the extent to which they 
agreed with statements such as, “Being good at tasks like this is an important part of who I am,” 
and “Doing well on intelligence tasks like this is very important to me.” Participants’ responses 
to these items were averaged to produce one overall task engagement variable (α = .76). 
Finally, state self-esteem was assessed using Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale (with 
the instructions adapted to indicate how participants felt “right now”). On a scale of 1 (not at all) 
to 7 (very much so), participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with statements such 
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as, “I take a positive attitude toward myself,” and “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.” 
Participants’ responses to these items were averaged to produce one overall state self-esteem 
variable (α = .85). The order of all dependent measures was counterbalanced. (See Appendices 
C-F for a complete list of dependent measures.) 
Analysis Plan 
 The primary analyses for Study 1 consisted of a series of one-way ANOVAs exploring 
the effect of affirmation condition (self-affirmation vs. nationality-affirmation vs. political party-
affirmation vs. non-affirmation) on participants’ task performance attributions, challenge/threat 
experiences, task domain engagement, and state self-esteem. Additionally, several exploratory 
tests were run based on the results of these primary analyses.   
Results 
RAT Performance 
As intended, participants generally performed poorly on the RAT (M = 2.89; SD = 1.95). 
Nevertheless, a small number of participants performed well. Those who did well presumably 
would not experience the intended self-esteem threat and, thus, would have little need to engage 
in self-serving attributions or disengage from the task. Thus, participants who correctly answered 
eight or more of the ten items correctly (n = 14) were removed from subsequent analyses. Of the 
remaining 401 participants, 99 had been randomly assigned to the non-affirmation condition, 102 
to the self-affirmation condition, 102 to the nationality-affirmation condition, and 98 to the 
political party-affirmation condition. 
Affirmed Values 
 There was some variation across affirmation condition in terms of the specific values that 
participants chose to write about. The majority of participants who self-affirmed (n = 102) 
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selected either “Family” (37.3%) or “Relationships” (15.7%) as their most important value. The 
next most-selected values were “Honesty” (9.8%) and “Independence” (8.8%), with all other 
values being selected by less than five percent of those who self-affirmed. Participants who 
affirmed their nationality (n = 102) tended to affirm on either “Family” (32.4%) or 
“Independence” (25.5%). The next most-selected values for these participants were “Physical 
Attractiveness” (8.8%), “Social Life” (7.8%), and “Relationships” (6.9%). Finally, for 
participants who affirmed their political party, there was a dichotomy between those who 
identified as Democrats and those who identified as Republicans. For Democratic participants 
who affirmed their party (n = 70), a majority selected “Concern for Others” (55.5%) as their 
party’s most important value. The next most-selected values were “Independence” (15.7%) and 
“Social Life” (7.1%). For Republican participants (n = 28), a majority selected “Independence” 
(53.6%) as their party’s most important value, with “Family” (17.9%) and “Religion/Spirituality” 
(17.9%) being the next most-selected values.     
Task Performance Attributions  
Correlations among each of the individual performance attribution measures can be found 
in Table 1. A general linear model (GLM) procedure was used to examine the effects of 
affirmation condition on the extent to which participants attributed their performance on the 
RAT to specific internal and external factors (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations 
within each condition). 
Overall, participants tended to attribute their performance on the RAT to the task being 
difficult (M = 4.82, SD = 1.46) to a greater extent than to the task being easy (M = 2.21, SD = 
1.20), their ability to do well (M = 3.48, SD = 1.47), their inability to do well (M = 3.80, SD = 
1.53), their effort (M = 3.33, SD = 1.41), their lack of effort (M = 3.45, SD = 1.57), good luck (M 
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= 2.12, SD = 1.33), and bad luck (M = 2.43, SD = 1.45). Importantly, there was no difference 
across affirmation conditions for any of these performance attributions: the task being difficult 
(F(3, 397) = .92, p = .43), ), the task being easy (F(3, 397) = .90, p = .44), participants’ ability 
(F(3, 397) = .15, p = .93), participants’ lack of ability (F(3, 397) = 1.40, p = .24), participants’ 
effort (F(3, 397) = 1.40, p = .24), participants’ lack of effort (F(3, 397) = 1.22, p = .30), good 
luck (F(3, 397) = .89, p = .45), and bad luck (F(3, 397) = .32, p = .81).   
This trend played out with the attribution rankings as well, with task difficulty being 
ranked most impactful overall (M = 1.79, SD = .92), followed by effort (M = 2.34, SD = .95), 
ability (M = 2.35, SD = .96), and luck (M = 3.52, SD = .87). There was also no difference across 
affirmation conditions for participants’ rankings of these four primary attributions: task difficulty 
(F(3, 397) = 1.48, p = .22), ability (F(3, 397) = .78, p = .51), effort (F(3, 397) = .50, p = .69), and 
luck (F(3, 397) = 1.59, p = .19).  
Challenge/Threat, Task Engagement, and Self-Esteem 
Correlations among challenge emotions, threat emotions, task engagement, and state self-
esteem following the self-threatening task can be found in Table 3. A GLM procedure was used 
to examine the effects of affirmation condition on each of these variables (see Table 4 for means 
and standard deviations within each condition). 
There was no difference across affirmation condition for participant experiences of 
challenge-related emotions, (F(3, 397) = 1.23, p = .30), or threat-related emotions, (F(3, 397) = 
.97, p = .41). There also was no difference across affirmation condition for task engagement, 
(F(3, 397) = 1.55, p = .20). Overall, participants did not experience much challenge (M = 2.80, 
SD = 1.30) or threat-related emotions (M = 2.57, SD = 1.42) after completing the RAT. 
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Participants also reported feeling relatively disengaged from the task domain (M = 2.98, SD = 
1.19). These descriptive statistics reflect responses on a seven-point scale.  
For state self-esteem, however, there was a significant difference across affirmation 
conditions, F(3, 397) = 2.86, p = .037, η2partial = .021. Contrast analyses revealed that this pattern 
was driven by participants in the self-affirmation condition (see Figure 1). Participants who self-
affirmed (M = 5.46, SD = .94) reported significantly higher levels of state self-esteem than 
participants who affirmed their political party (M = 5.04, SD = 1.06; F(1, 397) = 8.27, p = .004, 
η2partial = .02). Self-affirmed participants also reported marginally higher levels of state self-
esteem than those who affirmed their nationality (M = 5.19, SD = 1.08; F(1, 397) = 3.53, p = 
.061, η2partial = .01) and those who were not affirmed at all (M = 5.21, SD = 1.05; F(1, 397) = 
2.92, p = .089, η2partial = .007). Finally, participants who self-affirmed reported significantly 
higher levels of state self-esteem compared to participants in all other conditions combined, F(1, 
397) = 7.01, p = .008, η2partial = .017. 
The state self-esteem of participants in the two group-affirmation conditions did not 
differ significantly from one another, F(1, 397) = 1.03, p = .31. Additionally, participants who 
group-affirmed did not differ from those who were not affirmed at all, F(1, 397) = .59, p = .45). 
Thus, although self-affirmation protected participants’ self-esteem following a threat to the 
individual self, affirming a group identity (either nationality or political party) did not have this 
same buffering effect. 
Affirmation/Threat Order  
The previous analyses were re-run with affirmation-threat order included as a potential 
moderator. The order in which participants completed the affirmation manipulation (before or 
after the self-threating task) did not have an impact on task performance attributions, 
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threat/challenge emotions, task engagement, or self-esteem. Order also did not moderate the 
effect of affirmation condition on any of the dependent measures. 
Exploratory Analyses  
 Because the comparison between participants in the self-affirmation condition and those 
in the other affirmation conditions produced a distinct pattern with respect to self-esteem, this 
relationship was further analyzed with several exploratory tests. Specifically, after examining the 
pattern of means for each dependent variable, the comparison between self-affirmed participants 
and all other participants was tested for the task engagement variable. Although there was no 
omnibus effect of affirmation condition on engagement ratings, contrast analyses revealed that 
participants who self-affirmed reported less engagement with the task domain than participants 
in all other conditions combined, F(1, 397) = 4.53, p = .034, η2partial = .011). 
From this analysis, the link between task engagement and self-esteem, based on 
affirmation condition, was explored. Specifically, it was hypothesized that, when comparing self-
affirmed participants to all other participants, task engagement might mediate the relationship 
between affirmation condition and state self-esteem. A simple mediation analysis using Hayes’ 
(2013) PROCESS macro was used to test this pattern. As can be seen in Figure 2, participants in 
the self-affirmation condition reported being less engaged with the RAT performance domain 
than participants in all other affirmation conditions (b = .29, t(399) = 2.13, p = .034, 95% C.I. 
[0.02, 0.56]). Additionally, controlling for affirmation condition, the less engagement 
participants expressed, the greater was their state self-esteem, (b = -.28, t(398) = -6.75, p < .001, 
95% C.I. [-0.36, -0.20]). A bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect (b 
= -.08, SE = .04) based on 10,000 bootstrap samples did not include zero (-0.17 to -0.004). The 
direct effect of affirmation condition on self-esteem remained significant, however, (b = -.23, 
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t(398) = -2.05, p = .041, 95% C.I. [-0.45, -0.01]). Thus, task disengagement partially mediated 
the effect of self-affirmation (compared to all other conditions) on participant state self-esteem. 
Discussion 
Study 1 explores the previously untested question of whether affirming the collective 
level of identity can counter threats and reduce bias at the individual level of identity. This was 
not found to be the case. In terms of attributional biases, neither self-affirmation nor group-
affirmation affected the extent to which participants attributed self-threatening task performances 
to internal (ability, effort) or external (luck, task difficulty) factors. Additionally, affirmation 
condition did not have an overall effect on participants’ experience of challenge or threat-related 
emotions. The lack of an affirmation effect on task attributions was especially surprising given 
the wealth of research demonstrating the effectiveness of self-affirmation at mitigating self-
serving biases (McQueen & Klein, 2006; Sherman & Cohen, 2002). It may be the case that the 
RAT was simply too difficult to elicit any variation in attributions across conditions. On both the 
specific attribution items and the rank-ordering of importance, participants across the board 
indicated that task difficulty was the most important determinant in how they performed. Thus, 
task difficulty may have overwhelmed any affirmation effect that may have been taking place.  
However, there was an overall effect of affirmation condition on participants’ self-esteem 
following the threat. This effect was driven by self-affirmation, such that the self-esteem of self-
affirmed participants was buffered following the threat, whereas those who affirmed a group 
identity (or did not affirm at all) did not exhibit a self-esteem boost. Thus, there was a 
discrepancy between the process of affirming the individual self and the process of affirming the 
collective self. Self-affirmation protected self-esteem from an individual-level threat, whereas 
group-affirmation did not. This pattern supports my underlying hypothesis that affirming the self 
       32 
 
and affirming the group are theoretically distinct processes, and suggests that group-affirmation 
may not be an effective means of protecting the individual self from threat. Additionally, because 
the collective self is not “primary” (Gaertner et al., 2002), affirming at that level of identity may 
not produce an effect that is potent enough to translate to the individual level of identity (as is the 
case when one self-affirms to counter group-level threats).  
Finally, exploratory analyses were run assessing the relationship between self-
affirmation, task engagement, and self-esteem. When comparing self-affirmation to all other 
affirmation conditions, it was found that engagement partially mediated the effect of self-
affirmation on state self-esteem. Participants that self-affirmed became less engaged with the 
self-threatening task domain than those who did not self-affirm, and this resulted in higher levels 
of state self-esteem. This pattern of results does not support the hypothesis that affirming the self 
reduces defensiveness by leading participants to become more engaged with the threatening task 
domain. However, this finding does make sense within the context of recent research on the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying self-affirmation. Critcher and Dunning (2015), for instance, 
argue that self-affirmation “works” because it expands the working self-concept and reduces 
focus on the threatened domain, thus allowing one’s sense of self-worth to realign with a broader 
dispositional view of the self. Less task engagement could be a manifestation of this broadening 
process. It should be emphasized, however, that these analyses were exploratory in nature, and 
thus need to replicated before a definitive conclusion can be drawn. Additionally, because these 
data are cross-sectional, and the order of the dependent variables was counterbalanced, one 
cannot be certain whether this model reflects the true causal path.   
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STUDY 2 
 Whereas Study 1 tests whether affirming the collective self can bolster self-esteem and 
reduce bias at the individual level of identity, Study 2 addresses the question of whether 
affirming the group can reduce bias while still operating at the collective level of identity. 
According to my theoretical model of the collective self, this might be the case if a reduction in 
bias corresponds with the psychological attributes (e.g., attitudes, behavioral tendencies) that 
define or are otherwise pertinent to the specific group identity that is affirmed. For example, in 
the context of American political parties, it might be considered a part of one’s party identity to 
possess favorable, benevolent attitudes towards some groups of people and unfavorable, hostile 
attitudes towards others. For instance, it might be part of one’s Republican identity to view 
Palestinians or undocumented immigrants negatively but Israelis or gun enthusiasts positively. 
On the other hand, it might be a part of one’s Democratic identity to demonstrate the opposite 
attitudinal pattern. Thus, although people may have a general tendency to be hostile and biased 
when operating in a group-level mind-set, I argue that these tendencies can be kept in check if 
there is a group-based norm in place that promotes positivity.   
Study 2 was designed to test whether affirming one’s political identity can decrease 
collective-level bias, as defined by a greater expression of favorable attitudes towards out-groups 
one’s political party is “supposed” to view favorably, following a group-level threat. If group-
affirmation activates the psychological attributes associated with the affirmed identity, then those 
positive attitudes towards favorable out-groups should be more prevalent for those that group-
affirm than those that do not. Additionally, Study 2 tests whether a group-affirmation procedure 
can also increase group-level bias, as defined by a decrease in the expression of favorable 
attitudes towards out-groups one’s political party is not “supposed” to view favorably, following 
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a threat. Thus, group-affirmation should simultaneously decrease and increase out-group biases 
based on what is prescribed by one’s political identity. 
Out-Group Selection Pilot Study  
In order to determine which groups of people the Republican and Democratic parties find 
to be more and less favorable, and thus which groups would be used as the out-groups in Study 
2, a pilot study was conducted. In this study, a sample of political partisans was presented with a 
list of groups (e.g., Evangelical Christians, Muslims, illegal immigrants, police officers) and 
asked to indicate how favorably they viewed members of those groups on a scale from 1 (not at 
all favorably) to 7 (extremely favorably). The list of groups was taken from Chambers, 
Schlenker, and Collisson’s (2013) analysis of political intolerance. They argue that there are 
certain groups which people tend to identify as being more liberal-leaning or conservative-
leaning, and that people tend to be less tolerant of those groups that they perceive as leaning 
towards the opposing political ideology. 
Group selection was based on two criteria. First, there needed to be sufficient spread 
between Republican and Democratic participants’ ratings of the group in the pilot study. In 
practice, this meant that favorability ratings needed to be above the mid-point for participants 
from one party and below the mid-point for participants from the other party in order to be 
considered “favorable” and “unfavorable,” respectively. Additionally, the selected groups needed 
to be considered out-groups by most potential participants. For instance, although “people who 
are pro-choice” received highly polarized ratings, it was likely that any sample collected for 
Study 2 would include a substantial proportion of people that consider themselves pro-choice. 
Thus, that group was not selected.   
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From this list of groups, four were chosen to be included as the out-groups in Study 2. 
Two of those groups were Republican-leaning: police/law-enforcement officers and gun-rights 
activists. Two of those groups were Democratic-leaning: welfare recipients and 
undocumented/illegal immigrants.   
Hypotheses 
Participants in Study 2 were presented with a group-threatening stimulus (an article 
presenting threatening information about the political party with which they identified) and either 
affirmed the self, affirmed their political party, or did not affirm at all. They then completed a 
series of measures assessing their attitudes towards the favorable and unfavorable out-groups 
selected in the pilot study. Finally, the individual-level factors of challenge/threat experiences 
and state self-esteem were assessed following the threat and affirmation.  
In order to capture a broad swath of participants’ overall attitudes towards the out-groups, 
three distinct constructs were assessed: positive and negative emotional reactions towards out-
group members, general evaluations (e.g., positive versus negative) of out-group members, and 
prosocial behavioral intentions towards out-group members. Additionally, because a number of 
studies have shown that group identification predicts greater levels of intergroup bias (e.g., 
Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000; Ehrlich & Gramzow, 2015), participants’ identification with 
their political party was also assessed.    
Based on previous research documenting the power of self-affirmation to reduce 
collective-level biases (e.g., Sherman & Kim, 2005), it was hypothesized that participants who 
affirmed the self would demonstrate an increase in positive emotional reactions, evaluations, and 
behavioral intentions towards members of all four out-groups, regardless of their own political 
affiliation. Thus, even for out-groups with which they are “supposed” to view unfavorably, the 
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general bias-reducing effect of self-affirmation should make participants view them more 
positively. Crucially, however, it was hypothesized that participants who affirmed their political 
party would show a boost in positive attitudes only towards members of the groups they are 
“supposed” to have favorable attitudes towards (based on their political affiliation). In fact, it 
was predicted that participants who group-affirmed would demonstrate a decrease in positivity 
towards unfavorable out-groups. Additionally, it was hypothesized that political party 
identification would moderate any effect of affirmation condition on out-group attitudes. 
Finally, as was the case with the individual-level threat from Study 1, it was hypothesized 
that those who self-affirmed would exhibit higher levels of state self-esteem (a boost to their 
overall feelings of self-worth) following the group-level threat, whereas those who group-
affirmed (or did not affirm at all) would not show this boost.    
Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of 533 participants took part in Study 2. This sample size was based on a formal 
power analysis that accounted for the inclusion of a continuous-level moderating variable (viz., 
party identification). Rather than relying on the general recommendation of Funder et al. (2015) 
to recruit 100 participants per cell, GPower was used to determine an appropriate sample size. 
With one three-level factor (affirmation: control, self, group) and one continuous moderator 
(party identification), and assuming a small effect size for the affirmation by identification 
interaction (η2partial = .02), a sample size of roughly 480 would be required to achieve .80 power 
for this design. In order to guard against loss of data due to partial completion of the survey, total 
recruitment was set to include an additional 50 participants. 
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In an effort to get a diverse sample, participants were recruited from both a university 
participant pool and from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The sample consisted of 129 
undergraduate students in an introductory psychology course and 404 Amazon Mechanical Turk 
workers currently residing in the United States. Undergraduate participants received partial 
course credit for participating, whereas Mechanical Turk workers received $1. Overall, 268 men 
and 265 women aged 18 to 74 (M = 31.87, SD = 12.10) participated. In terms of race/ethnicity, 
77.7% of the sample identified as White, 9.6% as Asian, 6.0% as Hispanic, 4.7% as Black, 0.9% 
as Native American, and 0.2% as Pacific Islander. Another 0.9% identified as another race or as 
mixed race. Nearly all participants were United States citizens (96.6%) and spoke English as a 
first language (95.3%).  
Participants were randomly assigned to either the self-affirmation, political party-
affirmation, or non-affirmation (control) condition. This resulted in 174 participants being 
assigned to the self-affirmation condition, 168 participants to the political party-affirmation 
condition, and 191 to the non-affirmation condition.    
Procedure and Measures 
Participants completed an online questionnaire containing four sections. The first section 
consisted of informed consent, general demographic questions, and a measure of political party 
identification. The second section consisted of the affirmation manipulation. The third section 
consisted of the group-threatening stimulus, and the fourth section consisted of the out-group 
evaluation measures. These sections are described below. 
Importantly, the presentation order of the affirmation manipulation and group-threatening 
information (the second and third sections) was counterbalanced across participants. 
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Political Party Identification. Participants first indicated whether they were a Democrat, 
a Republican, or an Independent. If participants indicated that they were Independents, they were 
asked if they saw themselves as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party. This selection of 
political party affiliation determined which political party was threatened as well which out-
groups were classified as favorable and unfavorable for each participant. Overall there were a 
total of 248 Democrats, 116 Republicans, and 169 Independents. When Independents were 
collapsed across the party in which they felt closest to, the final sample consisted of 351 
Democrats and 182 Republicans.  
Additionally, as an index of party identification, participants were asked to indicate how 
strongly they identified with both the Republican and Democratic parties on a seven-point scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).   
Affirmation Manipulation. The affirmation procedure was identical to that of Study 1 
for participants in the self-affirmation condition, political party-affirmation condition, and non-
affirmation (control) condition. The nationality-affirmation condition was not central to the 
current set of hypotheses and thus was not included in Study 2. 
Group-Threatening Information. All participants read a brief article summarizing the 
results of a recent study that assessed the relative intelligence of Democrats and Republicans. 
Participants read that, using a variety of tests, analysts from an independent research group found 
that their political party was less intelligent than the opposing party. They also read that this 
difference was quite significant and held up even when controlling for demographic factors such 
as race, gender, age, and socioeconomic status (see Appendix G for the full text of the article). 
The article was taken from an online source (Last, 2015) and edited slightly for content, 
grammar, and flow. Democratic and Republican participants read articles that were identical in 
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content, except for the name of the political party described as less intelligent. Democratic 
participants read that Democrats were less intelligent, whereas Republican participants read that 
Republicans were less intelligent. This threat-inducing method was chosen because it focused on 
a specific aspect of participants’ political identities (their group’s intelligence), thus providing an 
avenue for them to affirm a different, unrelated dimension of their political identities. 
Additionally, it has been demonstrated that receiving negative feedback about the intelligence of 
one’s group as a whole is a reliable way to induce a threat response from individual members 
(Hunter, Platow, Bell, & Kypri, 1997; Martiny, Kessler, & Vignoles, 2011).  
Dependent Measures. Following the affirmation manipulation and group-threatening 
stimulus, all participants completed a series of dependent measures assessing their attitudes 
towards the four out-groups that were determined by the group-selection pilot test: police/law 
enforcement officers, gun-rights activists, people on welfare, and undocumented/illegal 
immigrants. For each of the four out-groups, these measures consisted of items assessing specific 
emotional reactions towards members of that out-group, a general out-group evaluation measure, 
and a measure of behavioral intentions towards that out-group.  
Out-group emotional reactions were assessed with the group-based Anger/Fear/Respect 
Index (Mackie et al., 2000; Rey et al., 2008). For this measure, participants indicated the extent 
to which they felt various negative emotions (e.g., “Afraid,” “Furious”) and positive emotions 
(e.g., “Admiring,” “Appreciative”) towards members of each out-group on a scale ranging from 
1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so).3 Participants’ responses for the negative emotions and the 
positive emotions were averaged for each group producing eight outcome variables: negative 
emotions regarding police/law-enforcement officers (α = .94), positive emotions regarding 
police/law-enforcement officers (α = .90), negative emotions regarding gun-rights activists (α = 
       40 
 
.96), positive emotions regarding gun-rights activists (α = .92), negative emotions regarding 
welfare recipients (α = .91), positive emotions regarding welfare recipients (α = .90), negative 
emotions regarding undocumented/illegal immigrants (α = .94), and positive emotions regarding 
undocumented/illegal immigrants (α = .89).  
General out-group evaluations were assessed with a six-item measure adapted from Voci 
and Hewstone (2003). Participants rated their general attitudes towards each out-group on 
several evaluative dimensions using a 7-point semantic differential scale (e.g., “cold-warm,” 
“positive-negative,” “hostile-friendly”). Participants’ ratings were averaged for each group 
producing four outcome variables: police/law enforcement officer evaluations (α = .95), gun-
rights activist evaluations (α = .96), welfare recipient evaluations (α = .94), and 
undocumented/illegal immigrant evaluations (α = .96).  
Finally, behavioral intentions towards out-group members were assessed with a 5-item 
measure adapted from Husnu and Crisp (2010). On a scale ranging from 1 (highly unlikely) to 7 
(highly likely), participants indicated the likelihood that they would engage in various contact-
promoting behaviors with members of each out-group in the near future. Such behaviors 
included interacting with members of those groups and donating money to organizations that 
support those groups. Participants’ responses to the behavioral items were averaged for each 
group producing four outcome variables: behavior towards police/law enforcement officers (α = 
.89), behavior towards gun-rights activists (α = .89), behavior towards welfare recipients (α = 
.88), and behavior towards undocumented/illegal immigrants (α = .90). A full list of the out-
group attitudinal measures can be found in Appendices H-J. 
Participants also completed the same challenge/threat reaction scale and state self-esteem 
scale from Study 1. Participants’ responses for the challenge emotions, threat emotions, and state 
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self-esteem were averaged to produce one overall challenge variable (α = .84), one overall threat 
variable (α = .86), and one overall self-esteem variable (α = .94). The presentation order of all 
dependent measures was counterbalanced across participants. 
Analysis Plan 
 The primary analyses for Study 2 consisted of a series of general linear model (GLM) 
procedures testing the effects of affirmation condition (self-affirmation vs. political party-
affirmation vs. non-affirmation), political party identification (a centered continuous variable), 
and the Affirmation X Identification interaction on participants’ emotional reactions, general 
evaluations, and behavioral intentions towards favorable and unfavorable out-groups. Regression 
analyses were then run to break down any interaction effects at low and high levels of party 
identification. Additionally, one-way ANOVAs exploring the effect of affirmation condition on 
participants’ challenge/threat experiences and state self-esteem were also conducted.    
Results 
Affirmed Values 
 As was the case in Study 1, there was some variation across affirmation condition in 
terms of the specific values that participants chose to write about. The majority of participants 
who self-affirmed (n = 174) selected either “Family” (27.6%), “Independence” (15.5%) or 
“Relationships” (12.1%) as their most important value. The next most-selected values were 
“Honesty” (8.0%) “Art/Music” (7.5%) and “Sense of Humor” (7.5%), with all other values being 
selected by less than five percent of those who self-affirmed. For participants who affirmed their 
political party, there was a dichotomy between those who identified as Democrats and those who 
identified as Republicans. For Democratic participants who affirmed their party (n = 106), a 
majority selected “Concern for Others” (70.8%) as their party’s most important value. The next 
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most-selected values were “Independence” (10.4%) and “Social Life” (5.7%). For Republican 
participants (n = 62), a majority selected either “Independence” (33.9%) or “Family” (24.2%) as 
their party’s most important value, with “Religion/Spirituality” (17.7%) being the next most-
selected value.     
Out-Group Attitudinal Measures 
 For each out-group attitudinal measure (negative emotions, positive emotions, general 
evaluations, and behavioral intentions), participants’ responses were averaged for the two groups 
that their political party views as favorable and the two groups that their party views as 
unfavorable. Thus, for Republican participants, responses for police/law-enforcement officers 
and gun-rights activists were averaged to create favorable group measures, and responses for 
welfare recipients and undocumented/illegal immigrants were averaged to create unfavorable 
group measures. This resulted in a total of eight variables assessing participants’ attitudes 
towards out-groups: negative emotions towards unfavorable groups, negative emotions towards 
favorable groups, positive emotions towards unfavorable groups, positive emotions towards 
favorable groups, general evaluations of unfavorable groups, general evaluations of favorable 
groups, behavioral intentions towards unfavorable groups, and behavioral intentions towards 
favorable groups.4 Correlations among each of these variables can be found in Table 5.  
Out-Group Emotions. A general linear model (GLM) procedure was used to examine 
the effects of affirmation condition (Affirmation: self, group, control), political party 
identification (Identification: centered continuous predictor), and the Affirmation X 
Identification interaction on participants’ emotional reactions towards members of favorable out-
groups and unfavorable out-groups. Analyses were run separately for favorable groups and 
unfavorable groups as well as for negative emotions and positive emotions.  
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For the negative emotions towards unfavorable groups, only the party identification main 
effect was significant, F(1, 527) = 13.83, p < .001, η2partial = .026. Overall, the more participants 
identified with their political party, the stronger their negative emotional reactions towards 
unfavorable out-group members. There was not a significant affirmation condition main effect, 
F(2, 527) = 1.14, p = .32, nor a significant interaction between party identification and 
affirmation condition, F(2, 527) = .88, p = .42. For the negative emotions towards favorable 
groups, the party identification main effect, F(1, 527) = 1.28, p = .24, affirmation condition main 
effect, F(2, 527) = .85, p = .43, and Identification x Affirmation interaction all failed to reach 
significance, F(2, 527) = 1.32, p = .27.  
For the positive emotions towards unfavorable groups, the party identification main effect 
was marginally significant, F(1, 527) = 3.32, p = .069, η2partial = .006. There was not a significant 
affirmation condition main effect, F(2, 527) = .65, p = .52, nor a significant interaction between 
party identification and affirmation condition, F(2, 527) = .53, p = .59. 
For the positive emotions towards favorable groups, the party identification main effect 
was significant, F(1, 527) = 14.01, p < .001, η2partial = .026. Overall, the more participants 
identified with their political party, the stronger their positive emotional reactions towards group 
members. There was also a significant affirmation condition main effect, F(2, 527) = 6.40, p = 
.002, η2partial = .024. This was qualified by a significant interaction between party identification 
and affirmation condition, F(2, 527) = 6.18, p = .002, η2partial = .023. 
In order to specify the precise pattern contributing to the overall interaction, a series of 
regression analyses were run to examine the effects of affirmation condition (a between-subjects 
factor) on positive emotions towards favorable out-group members at low and high levels of 
political party identification (a continuous variable). High and low levels of identification were 
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defined as one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. As shown in Figure 3, 
the effect of party identification on positive group emotions was significant only for participants 
in the non-affirmation condition, b = .36, SE = .07, t(527) = 5.17, p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.22, 0.50]. 
There was no effect of identification on emotional reactions for participants in the self-
affirmation condition, b = .06, SE = .07, t(527) = .87, p = .39, or the political party-affirmation 
condition, b = .05, SE = .08, t(527) = .63, p = .53. Additionally, the identification effect was 
significantly stronger in the non-affirmation condition than in both the self-affirmation condition, 
b = .30, SE = .10, t(527) = 3.05, p = .002, 95% C.I. [0.12, 0.49] and the party-affirmation 
condition, b = .31, SE = .11, t(527) = 2.98, p = .003, 95% C.I. [0.11, 0.52]. The identification 
effect in the self- and party-affirmation conditions did not differ significantly from one another, b 
= .01, SE = .10, t(527) = .11, p = .92. Thus, only for participants who did not affirm, the more 
they identified with their political party, the stronger their positive emotional reactions to 
favorable out-groups.  
   Looking specifically at participants with low levels of party identification, the predicted 
mean of positive emotional reactions was significantly lower in the non-affirmation condition 
than in either the self-affirmation condition, b = .51, SE = .23, t(527) = 2.24, p = .026, 95% C.I. 
[0.06, 0.95] or party-affirmation condition, b = .71, SE = .24, t(527) = 3.01, p = .003, 95% C.I. 
[0.25, 1.17]. Predicted means for the self- and party-affirmation conditions did not differ from 
one another, b = .20, SE = .23, t(527) = .88, p = .38. At high levels of identification, the predicted 
mean was significantly higher in the non-affirmation condition than in the self-affirmation 
condition, b = .46, SE = .22, t(527) = 2.03, p = .042, 95% C.I. [0.02, 0.90], but not the party-
affirmation condition, b = .29, SE = .23, t(527) = 1.25, p = .21. Once again, predicted means for 
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the self- and party-affirmation conditions did not differ from one another, b = .17, SE = .24, 
t(527) = .70, p = .49. 
General Out-Group Evaluations. A general linear model (GLM) procedure was used to 
examine the effects of affirmation condition (Affirmation: self, group, control), political party 
identification (Identification: centered continuous predictor), and the Affirmation X 
Identification interaction on participants’ general evaluations of members of favorable out-
groups and unfavorable out-groups. Analyses were run separately for favorable groups and 
unfavorable groups.  
For the general evaluations towards unfavorable groups, neither the party identification 
main effect, F(1, 527) = .73, p = .39, affirmation condition main effect, F(2, 527) = 1.48, p = .23 
nor Identification x Affirmation interaction were significant, F(2, 527) = 1.21, p = .30. For the 
general evaluations towards favorable groups, however, the party identification main effect was 
significant, F(1, 527) = 17.12, p < .001, η2partial = .031. Overall, the more participants identified 
with their political party, the more favorable their out-group evaluations. There was also a 
significant affirmation condition main effect, F(2, 527) = 5.93, p = .003, η2partial = .022. This was 
qualified by a significant interaction between party identification and affirmation condition, F(2, 
527) = 5.73, p = .003, η2partial = .021. 
In order to specify the precise pattern contributing to the overall interaction, a series of 
regression analyses were run to examine the effects of affirmation condition (a between-subjects 
factor) on general evaluations towards favorable out-group members at low and high levels of 
political party identification (a continuous variable). High and low levels of identification were 
defined as one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. As shown in Figure 4, 
the effect of party identification on general evaluations was significant only for participants in 
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the non-affirmation condition, b = .27, SE = .05, t(527) = 5.30, p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.17, 0.37]. 
There was no effect of identification on evaluations for participants in the self-affirmation 
condition, b = .06, SE = .05, t(527) = 1.19, p = .24, or the political party-affirmation condition, b 
= .05, SE = .06, t(527) = .86, p = .39. Additionally, the identification effect was significantly 
stronger in the non-affirmation condition than in both the self-affirmation condition, b = .21, SE 
= .07, t(527) = 2.92, p = .004, 95% C.I. [0.07, 0.35] and the party-affirmation condition, b = .22, 
SE = .08, t(527) = 2.89, p = .004, 95% C.I. [0.07, 0.37]. The identification effect in the self- and 
party-affirmation conditions did not differ significantly from one another, b = .01, SE = .08, 
t(527) = .15, p = .88. Thus, only for participants who did not affirm, the more they identified 
with their political party, the more positive their evaluations of favorable out-groups.  
   Looking specifically at participants with low levels of party identification, the predicted 
mean of general evaluations was significantly lower in the non-affirmation condition than in 
either the self-affirmation condition, b = .33, SE = .16, t(527) = 2.04, p = .042, 95% C.I. [0.01, 
0.66] or party-affirmation condition, b = .51, SE = .17, t(527) = 2.98, p = .003, 95% C.I. [0.17, 
0.84]. Predicted means for the self- and party-affirmation conditions did not differ from one 
another, b = .17, SE = .17, t(527) = 1.03, p = .30. At high levels of identification, the predicted 
mean was significantly higher in the non-affirmation condition than in the self-affirmation 
condition, b = .33, SE = .16, t(527) = 2.04, p = .042, 95% C.I. [0.01, 0.65], but not the party-
affirmation condition, b = .20, SE = .17, t(527) = 1.16, p = .25. Once again, predicted means for 
the self- and party-affirmation conditions did not differ from one another, b = .14, SE = .17, 
t(527) = .79, p = .43. 
Out-Group Behavioral Intentions. A general linear model (GLM) procedure was used 
to examine the effects of affirmation condition (Affirmation: self, group, control), political party 
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identification (Identification: centered continuous predictor), and the Affirmation X 
Identification interaction on participants’ prosocial behavioral intentions towards members of 
favorable out-groups and unfavorable out-groups. Analyses were run separately for favorable 
groups and unfavorable groups.  
For behavioral intentions towards unfavorable groups, neither the party identification 
main effect, F(1, 527) = .01, p = .95, affirmation condition main effect, F(2, 527) = .75, p = .47 
nor Identification x Affirmation interaction were significant, F(2, 527) = 1.17, p = .31. For 
behavioral intentions towards favorable groups, however, the party identification main effect was 
significant, F(1, 527) = 31.66, p < .001, η2partial = .057. Overall, the more participants identified 
with their political party, the more favorable their behavioral intentions towards out-group 
members. Although there was not a significant affirmation condition main effect, F(2, 527) = 
2.26, p = .11, there was a significant interaction between party identification and affirmation 
condition, F(2, 527) = 3.17, p = .043, η2partial = .012. 
In order to specify the precise pattern contributing to the overall interaction, a series of 
regression analyses were run to examine the effects of affirmation condition (a between-subjects 
factor) on behavioral intentions towards favorable out-group members at low and high levels of 
political party identification (a continuous variable). High and low levels of identification were 
defined as one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. As shown in Figure 5, 
the effect of party identification on behavioral intentions was significant for participants in the 
non-affirmation condition, b = .34, SE = .06, t(527) = 5.41, p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.22, 0.47], the 
self-affirmation condition, b = .13, SE = .06, t(527) = 2.05, p = .04, 95% C.I. [0.006, 0.25].  and 
the political party-affirmation condition, b = .17, SE = .07, t(527) = 2.39, p = .017, 95% C.I. 
[0.03, 0.31]. However, the identification effect was significantly stronger in the non-affirmation 
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condition than in the self-affirmation condition, b = .21, SE = .09, t(527) = 2.37, p = .017, 95% 
C.I. [0.04, 0.39] and marginally stronger than in the party-affirmation condition, b = .18, SE = 
.10, t(527) = 1.84, p = .067, 95% C.I. [-0.36, 0.01]. The identification effect in the self- and 
party-affirmation conditions did not differ significantly from one another, b = .04, SE = .10, 
t(527) = .41, p = .68. Thus, for all participants, the more they identified with their political party, 
the stronger their prosocial behavioral intentions towards favorable out-groups. However, this 
effect was stronger for those who did not affirm.  
   Looking specifically at participants with low levels of party identification, the predicted 
mean of behavioral intentions in the non-affirmation condition was not significantly different 
than the predicted means in either the self-affirmation condition, b = .13, SE = .21, t(527) = .63, 
p = .53, or the party-affirmation condition, b = .34, SE = .21, t(527) = 1.58, p = .12. Predicted 
means for the self- and party-affirmation conditions also did not differ from one another, b = .21, 
SE = .21, t(527) = .99, p = .32. At high levels of identification, the predicted mean was 
significantly higher in the non-affirmation condition than in the self-affirmation condition, b = 
.55, SE = .20, t(527) = 2.72, p = .007, 95% C.I. [0.15, 0.95], but not the party-affirmation 
condition, b = .22, SE = .21, t(527) = 1.05, p = .29. Once again, predicted means for the self- and 
party-affirmation conditions did not differ from one another, b = .33, SE = .22, t(527) = 1.53, p = 
.13. 
All of the previous analyses were re-run with affirmation/threat order included as a 
potential moderator. It was found that the order in which participants completed the affirmation 
manipulation (before or after the group-threating stimulus) did not have an impact on any of the 
out-group attitudinal measures.   
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Individual-Level Reactions and Order Effects 
A GLM procedure was also used to examine the effects of affirmation condition on 
participants’ experience of challenge and threat related emotions and state self-esteem following 
the group-level threat (see Table 6 for means and standard deviations broken down by 
condition). 
There was no difference across affirmation condition for participant experiences of 
challenge-related emotions, F(2, 530) = .81, p = .45, or threat-related emotions, F(2, 530) = 1.66, 
p = .19.  
Overall, there was no main effect of affirmation condition on participants’ state self-
esteem, F(2, 527) = .92, p = 0.40. However, there was a marginally significant interaction 
between self-esteem and presentation order, F(2, 527) = 2.87, p = 0.058, η2partial = 0.011). Simple 
effects analyses revealed that this pattern was driven by participants in the self-affirmation 
condition (see Figure 6). For participants who self-affirmed, those who affirmed before the threat 
(M = 5.82, SD = 1.20) reported significantly higher levels of state self-esteem than those who 
affirmed after the threat (M = 5.35, SD = 1.27; F(1, 527) = 5.02, p = .025). There was no such 
effect of order for participants in either the non-affirmation condition, F(1, 527) = .54, p = .46, or 
party-affirmation condition, F(1, 527) = 1.36, p = .24. Additionally, among those who affirmed 
before the threat, there was a significant affirmation effect, such that those who affirmed the self 
(M = 5.82, SD = 1.20) reported higher levels of self-esteem than those who affirmed their 
political party (M = 5.27, SD = 1.44) or did not affirm at all (M = 5.57, SD = 1.29; F(2, 527) = 
3.03, p = .033). There was no effect of affirmation condition on self-esteem among participants 
who affirmed following the threat, F(2, 527) = .33, p = 0.72. Thus, although self-affirmation 
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protected participants’ self-esteem following a threat to the collective self (although this effect 
was marginal), affirming one’s political party identity did not have this same buffering effect. 
Discussion 
 Study 2 tests whether group-affirmation can reduce collective-level biases if certain 
unbiased attitudes are a core component of the affirmed group’s identity. Specifically, it tests the 
hypothesis that, in contrast to affirming one’s individual self which should lead to a general 
increase in positive attitudes towards all out-groups, regardless of political leaning, affirming 
one’s political party identity should only lead to an increase in positivity towards out-groups 
one’s party views favorably. Additionally, affirming one’s political party should lead to a 
decrease in positivity towards out-groups one’s party views unfavorably. Partial support was 
found for this hypothesis. Although affirmation condition did not affect participants’ attitudes 
towards unfavorable out-groups, it did interact with political party identification to influence 
positive emotional reactions, general evaluations, and prosocial behavioral intentions towards 
favorable out-groups. Specifically, affirming the group boosted positive out-group attitudes, 
particularly for those who did not identify strongly with their political party (although this effect 
was much weaker for the measure of behavioral intentions). Thus, for those who affirmed their 
political party, the relationship between party-identification and out-group attitudes was 
weakened, such that all participants responded more like highly identified group members. A 
similar bias-reducing pattern (although not quite as strong) was found for participants who self-
affirmed.  
This finding of a general de-coupling of party-identification from positive out-group 
attitudes following affirmation fits in with the notion that while affirming the self can lead to a 
general reduction in bias, affirming the group can also reduce bias if it is a part of that group’s 
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identity. However, the lack of an affirmation effect (or affirmation-identification interaction) on 
participants’ attitudes towards unfavorable out-groups is surprising. In fact, there seemed to be a 
lack of movement in general with respect to the unfavorable out-group attitudes such that even 
the party-identification main effects were weak and inconsistent. This is somewhat unexpected, 
especially given previous research documenting the hostility and negativity that tends to 
characterize politically-relevant attitudes (e.g., Ware, 2011). One explanation is that participants 
may have been hesitant to express negativity towards the specific out-groups used in this study 
for fear of coming across as “politically incorrect” or “bigoted” (seeing as all of the groups are 
associated with sensitive political issues). It also might be the case that, although attitudes 
towards the favorable out-groups are a core component of one’s political identity (and thus can 
be influenced by identification and affirmation), attitudes towards the unfavorable groups are 
not. For instance, an important part of one’s Democratic identity may be feelings of positivity 
and support for welfare recipients and undocumented immigrants, whereas negativity towards 
police officers and gun-rights activists may not be a core part of this identity.    
Study 2 also assessed the effect of self- and group-affirmation on participants’ individual-
level responses to the collective-level threat. Although affirmation condition had no effect on 
challenge/thereat experiences, a distinction did emerge between self-affirmation and group-
affirmation with respect to participants’ levels of state self-esteem. Only participants who 
affirmed their individual selves before the threat received a boost to their self-esteem (although 
this interaction effect was marginal). Those who affirmed their political party did not receive this 
boost, regardless of when they affirmed.    
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GENERAL DISCUSSION  
Research in a multitude of social psychological domains points to a fundamental 
distinction between individual-level processes and collective-level processes. One overarching 
finding is that when operating at the collective level of identity, people tend to behave in a more 
aggressive and defensive manner and adhere to group-based norms and biases to a greater extent 
than when operating at the individual level of identity. I posit that this occurs because a 
collective-level mind-set limits one’s psychological flexibility, causing one to think, feel, and 
behave more in line with the norms, attitudes and biases of a specific group identity (as well as 
the intergroup context as a whole). The distinction between the individual self and the collective 
self is particularly apparent in research on identity threat and affirmation theory. Although 
affirming the individual self consistently reduces defensiveness and bias in the face of 
individual-level threats (Cohen et al., 2000; Fein & Spencer, 1997), affirming the collective self 
does not consistently reduce, and in some cases exacerbates, bias in the face of collective-level 
threats (Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011; Ehrlich & Gramzow, 2015). I argue that this distinction 
occurs because self-affirmation capitalizes on the flexible nature of the individual self (allowing 
one to bolster the overall self-concept in a different domain), whereas group-affirmation induces 
a focus on a specific social identity, activating its associated psychological attributes and 
increasing one’s susceptibility to defensiveness and bias.   
However, it is possible that affirming the collective self need not necessarily make one 
more biased. Indeed, the purpose of the current research is to provide a direct test of whether 
there are certain situations in which affirming a group identity can actually decrease 
defensiveness and bias. One potential situation is if the group-affirmation is in response to a 
threat to the individual self. Theoretically, it may be hypothesized that, just as affirming the 
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individual self can reduce collective-level biases (Sherman & Kim, 2005), affirming the 
collective self should reduce individual-level biases. This question was explored in Study 1. 
Participants completed a self-threatening word association task and either affirmed their 
individual selves, affirmed their collective selves, or did not affirm at all. They then completed a 
series of measures assessing task performance attributions, challenge/threat experiences, 
engagement with the task domain, and state self-esteem. Neither self- nor group-affirmation had 
an impact on performance attributions, challenge/threat emotions, and task engagement. 
However, there was an effect of affirmation condition on self-esteem, such that participants who 
affirmed their individual selves reported higher levels of state self-esteem following the self-
threat than participants who affirmed their collective selves (or did not affirm at all). 
Additionally, an exploratory mediation analysis revealed that this effect of self-affirmation on 
self-esteem was partially mediated by participants’ disengagement from the self-threatening task 
domain.  
The lack of an effect of affirmation condition on performance attributions is surprising. It 
was predicted that, based on a large body of research touting the effectiveness of self-affirmation 
(McQueen & Klein, 2006; Sherman & Cohen, 2002), participants who affirmed their individual 
selves would be more willing to make self-threatening attributions for their poor performances 
on the RAT than those who did not affirm. This outcome is potentially a result of the nature of 
the task. It may have been the case that the difficulty of the word associations overwhelmed 
participants’ experiences to the point that any sort of affirmation may have been ineffective. 
Indeed, it was found that, regardless of affirmation condition, participants attributed their 
performance to the difficulty of the task more so than any other factor. Despite not having an 
effect on performance attributions, affirming the individual self did bolster participants’ state 
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self-esteem following the self-threat. Affirming the collective self, however, did not have this 
self-bolstering effect. This points to a distinction between affirming at the individual level as 
opposed to the collective level of identity.   
A second situation in which affirming the collective self may decrease bias is if certain 
unbiased attitudes are core components of the affirmed group’s identity. It may be the case, for 
example, that an important part of a particular group identity (such as a political party) is having 
positive, benevolent attitudes towards certain out-groups. If it is the case that group-affirmation 
activates the psychological constructs associated with that particular identity, then less biased 
attitudes (in this case, positive out-group attitudes) should become more prevalent after the 
affirmation. This hypothesis was tested in Study 2. Participants read an article that presented 
threatening information about their political party and completed either a self-affirming, political 
party-affirming, or a non-affirming task. They then completed a series of measures assessing 
their attitudes towards two out-groups that members of their political party tend to view 
favorably and two out-groups that members of their political party tend to view unfavorably. 
Although affirmation condition did not affect attitudes towards unfavorable out-groups, it did 
interact with party identification to alter emotional reactions, general evaluations, and positive 
behavioral intentions towards favorable out-groups. Specifically, affirming the group boosted 
positive out-group attitudes, particularly for those participants who did not identify strongly with 
their political party. Thus, for those who group-affirmed, the relationship between group 
identification and out-group attitudes was weakened, such that all participants behaved more like 
high-identifiers. A similar pattern of results was found for those who self-affirmed.   
Additionally, a distinction between self-affirmation and group-affirmation emerged with 
respect to participants’ state self-esteem following the group-level threat. Only participants who 
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affirmed their individual selves before the threat received a boost to their self-esteem (although 
this interaction effect was marginal). Those who affirmed their political party did not receive this 
boost, regardless of when they affirmed. Thus, a similar dichotomy between self- and group-
affirmation was found in both Study 1 and Study 2. Self-affirmation protected the self from both 
individual-level threats and collective-level threats, but group-affirmation did not. 
To summarize, affirming the collective self did not lead to a self-concept boost and 
reduction in bias in response to an individual-level threat (although affirming the individual-self 
also did not reduce bias). However, group-affirmation did reduce bias in response to a collective-
level threat when unbiased attitudes (defined as positive emotional reactions, evaluations, and 
prosocial behavioral intentions towards out-groups) were a component of the affirmed group’s 
psychological identity.    
Theoretical Implications 
The findings from Study 1 and Study 2 have implications for affirmation theory as well 
as for the theoretical nature of the individual and collective selves more broadly.  
Affirmation Theory. Although some researchers operate under the assumption that self- 
and group-affirmation should behave analogously in the face of threats to the individual and 
collective selves, respectively (Derks et al., 2009; Sherman et al., 2007), a substantial amount of 
research seems to indicate that affirming the self and affirming the group are two distinct 
processes (Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011; Ehrlich & Gramzow, 2015; Glasford et al., 2009). When 
focused on the personal self, an affirmation task consistently reduces both self and group-serving 
biases. Research suggests that this occurs because self-affirmation broadens one’s focus away 
from the threatened domain and onto one’s overall self-concept of worth, rendering judgments 
and biases related to other specific self-aspects or identities less psychologically relevant 
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(Critcher & Dunning, 2015). Support for this process was found in the current research. 
Although affirming the self did not have an impact on self-serving attributional biases, it did 
bolster the self-esteem of participants in response to both an individual-level threat (Study 1) and 
a collective-level threat (Study 2). The notion that self-affirmation broadens one’s focus was also 
supported by the exploratory results of Study 1’s mediation model. Although definitive 
conclusions from this analysis cannot be reached due to the cross-sectional nature of the data and 
post-hoc reasoning, it was found that participants who self-affirmed tended to be less engaged 
with their task performance than those in all other affirmation conditions. This disengagement, in 
turn, predicted higher levels of state self-esteem. Thus, participants tended to be less focused on 
the specific domain of their self-concept associated with the threat, and this was related to a 
tendency to feel better about themselves overall. 
Rather than inducing a broader focus on the overall self-concept, I argue that group-
affirmation narrows one’s focus onto a specific group-level identity. In doing so, group-
affirmation activates the psychological attributes (e.g., attitudes, stereotypes, norms, behavioral 
tendencies, intergroup comparisons) pertinent to that group membership. Once activated, this 
group-specific mindset guides subsequent thoughts, judgments, motivations, and behaviors. In 
many instances, a by-product of this mindset would be an increase in biases that serve to 
establish, protect, and enhance the worth and integrity of that group. In the case of the current 
research, however, when positive out-group attitudes were a part of the affirmed group’s 
psychological make-up, group-affirmation increased that out-group favorability (specifically for 
those who were not already highly identified with the in-group). Additionally, if group-
affirmation does indeed narrow one’s focus onto a particular social identity (as opposed to one’s 
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overall feelings of worth), then it makes sense that affirming the group did not provide a boost to 
participants’ self-esteem in response to threat. 
Three other issues related to affirmation theory are worth further discussion in light of 
these findings. The first is the relationship between identity affirmation and self-esteem. The 
direct link between self-affirmation and state self-esteem has not been assessed very often in the 
literature. Generally, when self-esteem is included in a study on affirmation theory, it is treated 
as a moderator of affirmation effects rather than an outcome (e.g., Creswell et al., 2005). The 
current research builds off of the limited work exploring the effect of self-affirmation on self-
esteem (Koole et al., 1999; Spencer-Rogers et al., 2016), by reinforcing the notion that self-
affirmation can bolster self-esteem following both an individual-level and collective-level threat. 
It also emphasizes the distinction between affirming the individual self as opposed to affirming 
the collective self, such that group-affirmation was not effective at bolstering the self following 
threat.  
The second theoretical issue relates to the timing of the affirmation manipulation. 
Although some researchers have concluded that whether the affirmation is administered before 
or after the threat is not a pertinent factor when it comes to assessing its effectiveness (McQueen 
& Klein, 2006), I found that order did play a minor role. Although self-affirmation bolstered 
participants’ self-esteem after an individual-level threat in Study 1 regardless of order, it only 
buffered against the collective threat in Study 2 if it was performed before participants were 
exposed to the group-threatening information. This discrepancy could be due to the nature of the 
threat. Critcher et al. (2010) argue that self-affirmation is most effective at providing a boost to 
the self-concept if it occurs before a defensive threat-response is initiated. The RAT performed 
by participants in Study 1 was a long, difficult task that likely consumed a considerable amount 
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of cognitive resources. It may have taken those participants longer to process the threat and 
initiate a response than the participants in Study 2 who were only exposed to a quick, direct 
group-level threat. Thus, those who self-affirmed after the threat in Study 2 may have already 
initiated their defensive processes by the time they began the manipulation, whereas for those 
participating in Study 1, this was not the case.  
The final issue relates to what constitutes an affirmation process. Specifically, these 
findings (and the findings in the affirmation theory literature more generally) seem to question 
the notion that one can truly be affirmed at the collective level of identity. If performing a group-
affirmation task does not bolster one’s self-concept and triggers a process that is qualitatively 
distinct from performing a self-affirmation task (as is being posited here), is it even possible to 
“affirm” the collective self? Perhaps the group-affirmation process differs depending on the 
nature of the affirmation procedure. Although this research employed the traditional and 
commonly used values-affirmation manipulation, it may be the case that a less immersive 
manipulation (such as receiving positive feedback about the in-group) will be able to provide a 
boost to self-worth without necessarily “activating” the collective-level mind-set and making 
attitudes and biases associated with that group identity psychologically predominant.  
 Nature of the Individual and Collective Selves. I believe that the findings from the 
current research fit within a theoretical model in which the collective self is conceptualized as a 
collection of multiple, independent social identities, or “branches” extending out from one’s 
overall self-concept. When a specific group membership, or “branch,” becomes salient (as is 
likely the case when one affirms a group identity), one becomes psychologically constrained and 
thus more prone to thinking and behaving in line with the attributes and guiding norms of that 
group. In Study 2, for example, participants who affirmed their political party identity exhibited 
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a relatively high level of favorability towards out-groups they were “supposed” to feel favorable 
towards based on their political party membership. When operating as an individual, on the other 
hand, (such as following an affirmation of the personal self) the self-concept becomes more 
malleable as one can experience and respond to his/her social environment independent of any 
group-based frame. Thus, participants in both Study 1 and Study 2 who self-affirmed showed a 
boost in self-esteem following threat, whereas those who group-affirmed did not. These findings 
also fit in with the notion that the individual self is motivationally primary (as compared to the 
collective self; Gaertner et al., 2002; Sedikides et al., 2013). Indeed, if the individual self is one’s 
“psychological home base,” then it would be expected that affirming at that level of identity 
would be more effective at countering threats, maintaining self-esteem, and decreasing bias than 
affirming the collective level of identity.  
One finding that seemingly runs counter to the notion that affirming the individual self 
and affirming the collective self are qualitatively distinct processes is the similar effect of self- 
and group-affirmation on positive out-group attitudes in Study 2. However, although affirming 
the self and affirming the group led to the same outcome, it is possible that it was through 
different mechanisms. In fact, it was initially hypothesized that, because self-affirmation tends to 
bolster feelings of overall self-worth and lead to a reduction in bias across domains, those who 
self-affirmed would exhibit positive attitudes towards out-group members. I would argue that 
group-affirmation, on the other hand, led to this similar result through an activation of the group 
enhancing attitudes consistent with participants’ specific political identities. 
Practical Implications 
 Although the current research has a heavy theoretical focus, there are also practical 
implications of these findings. One implication is the comparative effectiveness of self- and 
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group-affirmation to effect change. Research shows that affirming the individual self can be used 
as an effective intervention for a variety of social purposes, such as enhancing academic 
achievement, reducing stereotype threat, and improving health outcomes (Cohen & Sherman, 
2014). The current research suggests that affirming the collective identity, however, may not 
have these same benefits. If group-affirmation does not adequately boost feelings of self-worth 
or reduce bias and defensiveness in response to self-threats, interventions that target this level of 
identity may not have the potency to produce the desired results. Thus, when attempting to 
improve academic achievement of minority students or encourage college students to heed 
messages promoting safe sex, for example, affirmation interventions should target the individual 
level of identity rather than the collective.  
An affirmation of one’s collective identity may be especially detrimental when the goal is 
to effect change at the intergroup level. In situations of group-based competition and conflict, for 
example, events that affirm one’s group membership may further intensify the conflict, rather 
than mitigate it. It might be expected, for instance, that if a group achieves success (such as a 
political party winning an election), the affirmation that results from that success will bolster 
group members’ feelings of self-worth, thus making them more amenable to compromise and 
working with out-groups. The group-affirmation effects found in the current and previous 
research, however, seem to indicate that this would not be the case. Rather, reminders of group 
success and importance are likely to create even more division and ingroup-favoring tendencies 
by reinforcing the ideals, goals, and attributes that make the “affirmed” group unique. This 
activation of the group’s psychological attributes would subsequently guide future behavior 
towards out-groups. If performing a short affirmation task can have a significant effect on 
intergroup attitudes, it is not a stretch to believe that naturally occurring group-affirming 
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mechanisms or events (such as subtle reminders of group distinctions or important values) could 
be a detriment to peaceful intergroup interactions. 
 Finally, this research raises the practical question of whether it is possible to bolster the 
self-concept and reduce intergroup bias while still operating at the collective level of identity. 
Some of the most effective strategies for reducing intergroup bias and conflict rely on processes 
that break down group boundaries and detach individuals from their collective identities. This 
can be done directly through interventions that seek to alter the identity level at which 
individuals categorize themselves and out-group members (e.g., Rey et al., 2008) or indirectly 
through processes such as intergroup contact, which involves breaking down group boundaries 
through a personalization of individual out-group members (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Even 
self-affirmation reduces group-level bias by shifting one’s focus away from the threatening 
group-level domain (Ehrlich & Gramzow, 2015). In many group-based contexts, however, this 
escape from the collective mind-set is not possible. Based on the current findings, one potential 
strategy for reducing biased thinking while still operating as a group member might be to make 
unbiased attitudes a core component of the in-group’s psychological identity. For example, 
interventions designed to reduce partisan political conflict may find success by framing 
controversial policy positions or intergroup dialogue in a manner that fits in with the group’s 
existing goals and values.   
Limitations 
Although this work has some interesting theoretical and practical implications, there are 
also some limitations to these studies that should be addressed. First, as discussed above, the 
individual-level threat used in Study 1 may have overwhelmed participants, making it difficult to 
draw any definitive conclusions regarding the effects of self- and group-affirmation on self-
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serving attributional biases. It cannot be confirmed, for instance, if affirming the group failed to 
reduce individual-level biases because of the nature of the threat or because of a general lack of 
effectiveness of group-affirmation. I believe that this study should be re-run with a new threat 
that has the power to elicit differences across affirmation condition. This could be done in the 
context of a threatening health message. There is ample evidence that affirming the individual 
self makes people more willing to acknowledge health risks associated with harmful behaviors 
such as smoking and excessive alcohol consumption (Armitage, Harris, & Arden, 2011; 
Sweeney & Moyer, 2015). A future study should assess whether affirming the collective identity 
can also reduce defensiveness in the face of such health-related threats.  
A second limitation relates to how collective-level bias was conceptualized in Study 2. 
One of the underlying questions of this research is whether group-affirmation might reduce 
collective-level bias if a reduction in bias is a core component of the affirmed group’s identity. In 
the current research, reduction in collective-level bias was defined as an increase in positive 
attitudes towards out-groups that participants’ political parties tend to view favorably. It could be 
argued, however, that harboring more favorable attitudes towards groups one is supposed to like 
is actually an exemplification of increased bias (such that individuals become more biased 
towards the groups they are already supposed to view favorably). I think it would be useful to 
replicate the conceptual findings of Study 2 with a more direct definition of bias. For example, 
perhaps there is a particular group identity (such as being a scientist) in which evaluating 
information in an objective, unbiased way is a core component of that identity. Based on the 
theoretical reasoning discussed earlier, it would be predicted that affirming one’s scientist 
identity would lead one to interpret new information in a more objective manner, even if there 
was a personal incentive not to. 
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Finally, although the findings of the current research support the theoretical distinction 
between affirming the individual self and affirming the collective self, these studies do not 
directly test the proposed mechanisms underlying the self- and group-affirmation processes. For 
instance, although I propose that affirming a particular group identity activates the norms, 
attitudes, and biases associated with that group’s psychological make-up, that activation process 
was not tested directly. Thus, the observed affirmation effects could still be a result of extraneous 
factors characteristic of the particular groups being studied. McQueen and Klein (2006) state that 
it is even difficult to trace a specific cause-effect mechanism for self-affirmation processes and 
admit that it is quite possible that different mechanisms might be at work in different contexts. 
Further research should specifically differentiate the disparate mechanisms underlying self-
affirmation and group-affirmation in these specific contexts. 
Future Directions 
Despite these limitations, this work creates some avenues for potentially fruitful areas of 
future research. These studies are based on a fundamental theoretical distinction between the 
individual self and the collective self. One question that arises from this is how these affirmation 
processes would play out when this distinction between the individual and collective selves is 
blurred. For example, how might people with more interdependent views of the self, such as 
individuals from Eastern, collectivist cultures, respond to a group-affirmation as opposed to self-
affirmation task? Would they show a pattern of results similar to the one shown by participants 
in the current studies? Perhaps affirming at the collective level of identity would be more 
effective at boosting self-worth and reducing bias for those with more interdependent selves, 
seeing as their self-concepts tend to be defined more by relationships than by individual traits 
and attributes (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). There is some evidence that this might be the case. 
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Heine and Lehman (1997), for instance, found that affirming the individual self was an effective 
method of reducing post-decision dissonance for a group of Canadian participants but not for a 
group of Japanese participants. Additionally, performing a familial affirmation (affirming one’s 
family as a unit rather than oneself as an individual) was found to successfully improve academic 
performance among struggling Latino students (Covarrubias, Herrmann, and Fryberg, 2016) and 
reduce stereotype threat among a sample of Chinese women (Cai, Sedikides, & Jiang, 2012). 
These findings seem to indicate that an important factor in determining whether an affirmation 
manipulation will “work,” is if one is affirming an identity that is central to one’s self-definition 
(i.e., one’s personal identity in individualist cultures and one’s familial identity in collectivist 
cultures). Future research should test whether affirming a more interdependent identity can lead 
to a reduction in group-based bias for those with an interdependent self-concept (just as 
affirming an individual-level self-aspect does for those with an individualist self-concept). 
Additionally, whether affirming a group identity that is not necessarily the central piece of one’s 
self-concept (such as political or religious affiliation) would play out the same way across 
cultures should be explored. For example, would affirming a political identity activate the 
norms/attitudes/biases associated with that identity regardless of whether one has an independent 
or interdependent sense of self? 
Another theoretical question related to self-definition has to do with the relationship 
between group-affirmation and social identity complexity. Social identity complexity refers to 
the degree of overlap one perceives among their multiple social identities (Roccas & Brewer, 
2002). If one perceives a great deal of overlap between multiples identities (such as their 
political, religious, occupational, and educational identities), for instance, one’s identity structure 
becomes more simplified, resulting in stronger levels of in-group identification and less tolerant 
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attitudes towards out-groups than those with high levels of social identity complexity (Miller, 
Brewer, & Arbuckle, 2009). It would be interesting to test whether social identity complexity 
moderates the effect of group-affirmation on defensiveness and bias. If one shares a number of 
interrelated identities (and thus is low in social identity complexity), would affirming one of 
these social identities have a similar result as affirming the individual self (and potentially reduce 
bias) because that identity would presumably be more central to one’s overall self-concept? Or 
would affirming the collective identity lead to even stronger biased tendencies because it would 
be activating the norms, attitudes, and biases associated with all of the overlapping groups (as 
opposed to just one)? 
Future research should also assess the boundary conditions of the affirmation effects 
observed in these studies. It may be the case, for instance, that the idiosyncrasies of the social 
identity context that was used may have been driving some of the observed effects. Political 
identity is unique in that it is a highly competitive and bias-ridden intergroup context. It has been 
found, for instance, that American political identities are extremely susceptible to perceived 
threats (Crawford & Pilanski, 2014) and that sociopolitical concepts are especially “hot,” or 
affectively charged, such that people tend to behave in a more biased, hostile manner in political 
contexts than in other collective-level domains (Lodge & Taber, 2005). I posit that this is an 
advantage when it comes to testing for affirmation effects on bias. The political context provides 
a potent source of bias with which to explore the nuances of self- and group-affirmation. This 
may not be the case in collective-level contexts not defined as much by this intergroup dynamic, 
such as university affiliation or nationality. That being said, future work should test if the 
observed affirmation effects are limited to contexts in which there are clearly-defined biases and 
salient out-groups. Also, would a similar pattern of results be found if these studies were 
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conducted in the context of a group where members do not have a choice in membership, such as 
ethnicity? Additionally, would the results hold in a minimal-groups setting, or does group-
affirmation only have an effect on bias if the groups are well-established?  
Finally, the current research deals exclusively with affirmation processes at the individual 
and collective levels of identity. However, researchers often present the self-concept as 
containing three levels of identity: the individual self, the collective self, and the relational self 
(Brewer and Gardner, 1996; Sedikides et al., 2013). One question worth exploring is how the 
psychological processes that take place when one is operating at the relational level of identity 
map on to the other two levels. Specifically, does affirming the relational self function in a 
similar fashion to affirming the collective self? Or do important relationships merge with the 
individual self to the extent that affirming oneself as an individual and affirming one’s 
relationship become one and the same process?  
CONCLUSION 
It could be argued that it is the distinction between the individual self and the collective 
self which forms the backbone of social psychology. Research on the relationship between these 
two levels of identity point to a fundamental distinction in how people think, feel, and behave 
when operating at the collective level of identity as opposed to the individual level of identity. I 
posit that when operating as a group member, one becomes constrained by the norms and biases 
associated with that particular social identity, thus limiting one’s cognitive, affective, and 
behavioral flexibility. When operating as an individual, on the other hand, the self-concept 
becomes more malleable as one can experience and respond to his/her social environment 
independent of any group-based frame. Because of its inherent inflexibility, operating at the 
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collective level of identity generally leads to the expression of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors 
that are defensive, biased, and even hostile in nature. This may not always be the case, however.  
The current research uses the context of identity threat and affirmation theory to test 
whether operating at the collective level of identity (via group-affirmation) can, in fact, lead to a 
reduction in defensiveness, hostility, and bias. Although affirming the group did not affect 
participants’ attributional tendencies following the completion of a self-threatening task (Study 
1), group-affirmation did bolster positive out-group attitudes for low-identifying group members 
(Study 2). Specifically, those who affirmed their political party demonstrated a boost in 
positivity towards out-groups that their party tends to view favorably. Also, unlike affirming the 
self, affirming the group did not protect participants’ self-esteem from either an individual-level 
threat or a collective-level threat (Studies 1 and 2). Together, these findings lend further support 
to the notion that affirming the self and affirming the group are two distinct processes. However, 
they show that operating at the collective level of identity can, in fact, lead to greater intergroup 
positivity, provided that positivity is a core part of the in-group’s psychological identity.       
  
  
       68 
 
Endnotes 
1.) Because the self-threatening task involved making associations between common English 
words and phrases, analyses were also run with non-native English speakers removed 
from the sample. This did not result in any changes to the pattern of results, so all 
reported analyses include those participants. 
2.) Previous research documents the self-threatening nature of the RAT (e.g., Critcher & 
Dunning, 2015; McFarlin & Blascovich, 1984). In addition, a pilot test was conducted to 
ensure that participants would feel threatened when they attempted the specific version of 
the RAT used in Study 1. Undergraduate participants (N = 146) rated their performance 
on the RAT as “below average” (M = 2.19, SD = 0.77) on a 5-point scale (1 = bottom 
10%, 2 = blow average, 3 = average, 4 = above average, 5 = top 10%). This mean self-
performance rating of 2.19 was significantly below the “average” perceived performance 
option of 3, t(145) = -12.63, p < .001. Participants also were asked how “intelligent,” 
“competent,” and “good” the task made them feel on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(extremely). Participants reported feeling well below scale the mid-point of 4 on each of 
these items: “Intelligent” (M = 2.61; SD = 1.38); “Competent” (M = 2.83; SD = 1.34); 
“Good” (M = 2.83; SD = 1.47); ts(145) > 16, ps < .001.   
3.) The Anger/Fear/Respect Index (Mackie et al., 2000) is a scale comprised of three 
dimensions. Because the items that composed the “anger” and “fear” dimensions 
followed the same pattern in all analyses, they were combined into one “negative” 
dimension. 
4.) All GLM analyses were also run using attitudinal measures towards individual out-
groups as opposed to combining both favorable groups and both unfavorable groups into 
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single variables (i.e., classifying just police/law-enforcement officers as the favorable 
group for Republicans and welfare recipients as the favorable group for Democrats). The 
same pattern of results that was found when combining groups was found when each 
group was analyzed individually. 
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Table 1 
Bivariate correlations among RAT performance attribution measures (Study 1).  
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Bad luck 1 .09 .00 .15* .31* .20* .06 .09 
2. Difficult task -- 1 .25* .09   -.01 -.25* .07 .18* 
3. Lack of ability -- -- 1 -.07 -.04    -.03 .29* .17* 
4. Lack of effort -- -- -- 1 .04 .10 .05 -.17* 
5. Good luck -- -- -- -- 1 .35* .15* .26* 
6. Easy task -- -- -- -- -- 1 .21* .22* 
7. Ability -- -- -- -- -- -- 1 .15* 
8. Effort -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1 
 
Note. N = 401. 
 
*p < .05. 
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Table 2 
Means (standard deviations) of performance attribution measures within affirmation condition 
(Study 1). 
 Control Self-Affirm Nation-Affirm Party-Affirm 
Bad luck 2.37 (1.45) 2.35 (1.54) 2.46 (1.38) 2.53 (1.45) 
Difficult task 4.84 (1.57) 4.86 (1.44) 4.94 (1.33) 4.61 (1.50) 
Lack of ability 3.95 (1.51) 3.54 (1.49) 3.88 (1.51) 3.82 (1.62) 
Lack of effort 3.20 (1.51) 3.60 (1.49) 3.50 (1.55) 3.51 (1.71) 
Good luck 2.24 (1.41) 2.10 (1.40) 2.18 (1.39) 1.95 (1.09) 
Easy task 2.08 (1.08) 2.18 (1.18) 2.35 (1.21) 2.21 (1.31) 
High ability 3.43 (1.49) 3.47 (1.45) 3.45 (1.46) 3.56 (1.51) 
High effort 3.48 (1.37) 3.31 (1.41) 3.42 (1.27) 3.10 (1.56) 
Rankings     
Luck 3.60 (0.78) 3.42 (0.97) 3.63 (0.70) 3.43 (0.97) 
Task difficulty 1.71 (0.85) 1.84 (0.93) 1.70 (0.82) 1.93 (1.06) 
Ability 2.42 (0.95) 2.41 (0.99) 2.25 (0.96) 2.32 (0.96) 
Effort 2.27 (0.96) 2.32 (0.97) 2.43 (0.98) 2.33 (0.89) 
 
Note. N = 401. Values for individual attributions range from one to seven. Values for attribution  
 
rankings range from one to four.  
 
 
  
       72 
 
Table 3 
Bivariate correlations among challenge/threat experiences, task engagement, and state self-esteem 
(Study 1).  
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1. Challenge 1 .37* .14* -.02 
2. Threat -- 1 .23* -.23* 
3. Task engagement -- -- 1 -.33* 
4. Self-esteem -- -- -- 1 
 
Note. N = 401. 
 
*p < .05. 
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Table 4 
Means (standard deviations) of challenge/threat experiences, task engagement, and state self-
esteem within affirmation condition (Study 1) 
 Control Self-Affirm Nation-Affirm Party-Affirm 
Challenge 2.65 (1.39) 2.73 (1.32) 2.99 (1.17) 2.81 (1.32) 
Threat 2.47 (1.31) 2.53 (1.44) 2.77 (1.46) 2.49 (1.44) 
Task engagement 3.04 (1.18) 2.76 (1.22) 3.02 (1.13) 3.08 (1.20) 
Self-esteem 5.21 (1.05) 5.46 (0.94) 5.19 (1.08) 5.04 (1.06) 
 
Note. N = 401. 
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Table 5 
Bivariate correlations among out-group attitudinal variables broken down by favorable and 
unfavorable groups (Study 2).  
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Favorable Groups         
1. Negative Emotions 1 -.06 -.49* -.24* .35* .31* .12* .16* 
2. Positive Emotions -- 1 .73* .57* .26* -.09* -.21* .001 
3. General Evaluations -- -- 1 .65* .10* -.17* -.18* -.06 
4. Behavioral Intentions -- -- -- 1 .20* .03 -.07 .32* 
Unfavorable Groups         
5. Negative Emotions -- -- -- -- 1 -.07 -.51* -.22* 
6. Positive Emotions -- -- -- -- -- 1 .73* .63* 
7. General Evaluations -- -- -- -- -- -- 1 .62* 
8. Behavioral Intentions -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1 
 
Note. N = 533. 
 
*p < .05. 
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Table 6 
Means (standard deviations) of challenge/threat experiences and state self-esteem (when 
participants were affirmed either before or after the threat) broken down by affirmation 
condition (Study 2) 
 Control Self-Affirm Party-Affirm 
Challenge 3.46 (1.67) 3.67 (1.70) 3.48 (1.67) 
Threat 2.04 (1.35) 2.08 (1.39) 2.29 (1.43) 
Self-esteem (affirm first) 5.57 (1.29) 5.82 (1.20) 5.27 (1.44) 
Self-esteem (threat first) 5.53 (1.37) 5.35 (1.27) 5.50 (1.53) 
 
Note. N = 533. 
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Figure 1. Effect of affirmation condition on participants’ state self-esteem following a threat to 
the individual self (Study 1). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the means. 
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Figure 2. Exploratory model demonstrating that task disengagement partially mediates the effect 
of self-affirmation (compared to all other affirmation conditions) on state self-esteem (Study 1). 
Numbered paths reflect unstandardized regression coefficients (b). Indirect effect: b = -.08, SE = 
0.04, 95% C.I. [-0.17, -0.004]. 
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001.  
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Figure 3. Party identification predicting positive emotional reactions towards favorable out-
group members in the non-affirmation (control) condition, self-affirmation condition, and 
political party-affirmation condition (Study 2). “High” and “low” levels of party identification 
refer to 1 SD above and below the mean, respectively.   
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Figure 4. Party identification predicting general evaluations towards favorable out-group 
members in the non-affirmation (control) condition, self-affirmation condition, and political 
party-affirmation condition (Study 2). “High” and “low” levels of party identification refer to 1 
SD above and below the mean, respectively.   
  
4
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
5
5.2
5.4
Low High
G
e
n
e
ra
l O
u
t-
G
ro
u
p
 E
va
lu
at
io
n
s
Party Identification
Group Self Control
       80 
 
Figure 5. Party identification predicting behavioral intentions towards favorable out-group 
members in the non-affirmation (control) condition, self-affirmation condition, and political 
party-affirmation condition (Study 2). “High” and “low” levels of party identification refer to 1 
SD above and below the mean, respectively.  
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Figure 6. Effect of affirmation condition and presentation order on participants’ state self-esteem 
following a threat to the collective self (Study 2). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals 
around the means. 
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Appendix A 
Affirmation Manipulation (Study 1 and Study 2) 
Non-Affirmation 
Okay, we are now going to ask you to perform a simple thought experiment. Please take some 
time and think about everything that you have eaten and drank over the past 48 hours. In the 
space provided, please list as many of these things as you can remember. 
Self-Affirmation 
Okay, we are now going to ask you to perform a simple thought experiment. Please take some 
time and think about what you as an individual consider to be important. From the following list 
of values/issues*, please select the one that is most important to you personally. Please write a 
short paragraph explaining how this value or issue is relevant to you and why you consider it to 
be so important. 
Nationality-Affirmation (Study 1 only) 
Okay, we are now going to ask you to perform a simple thought experiment. Please take some 
time now and think about what members of your nationality (e.g., Americans) consider to be 
important. From the following list of values/issues*, please select the one that you think is the 
most important to members of your nationality as a group. Please write a short paragraph 
explaining how this value/issue is relevant to members of your nationality, and why they 
consider it to be so important. 
Political Party-Affirmation 
Okay, we are now going to ask you to perform a simple thought experiment. Please take some 
time and think about what [Republicans/Democrats] consider to be important. From the 
following list of values/issues*, please select the one that you think is the most important to the 
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[Republican/Democratic] party as a group. Please write a short paragraph explaining how this 
value/issue is relevant to the [Republican/Democratic] party, and why [Republicans/Democrats] 
consider it so important. 
 
*Values/Issues: Art/Music, Social Life, Relationships, Physical Attractiveness/Fashion, 
Athletics, Sense of Humor, Loyalty, Family, Honesty, Patience, Concern for Others, 
Religion/Spirituality, Independence  
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Appendix B 
Remote Associates Test (Study 1) 
Instructions 
The next section of the survey will consist of a test of cognitive ability. You will be presented 
with a series of 10 questions testing your ability to make associations between words. For each 
trial, you will first see three stimulus words. Your task is to type in a fourth word which, when 
combined with each of the three stimulus words, results in word pairs that make up a common 
compound word or phrase. For example:  
What word unites these three? 
rocking 
wheel 
high 
 
Correct response: Chair (rocking chair, wheelchair, high chair). After completing the task, you 
will be asked some questions regarding how well you performed. 
RAT Items 
(1) Pea, Shell, Chest = Nut; (2) Reading, Service, Stick = lip; (3) Flower, Friend, Scout = girl; 
(4) Control, Place, Rate = Birth; (5) Artist, Hatch, Route = Escape; (6) Self, Attorney, Spending 
= Defense; (7) Way, Ground, Weather = Fair; (8) Cottage, Swiss, Cake = Cheese; (9) Show, 
Life, Row = Boat; (10) Fight, Control, Machine = Gun 
Feedback 
You have now completed the word association test. You got [number correct] out of 10 questions 
correct. 
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Appendix C 
RAT Performance Attributions (Study 1) 
Individual Attributions 
    Not at all                                                                                                            Very much so 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                  5                   6                7 
  
1. To what extend do you think your performance on the word association task was the 
result of good luck? 
2. To what extend do you think your performance on the word association task was the 
result of bad luck? 
3. To what extend do you think your performance on the word association task was the 
result of the task being easy? 
4. To what extend do you think your performance on the word association task was the 
result of the task being difficult? 
5. To what extend do you think your performance on the word association task was the 
result of your ability to do well on tasks like these? 
6. To what extend do you think your performance on the word association task was the 
result of your inability to do well on tasks like these? 
7. To what extend do you think your performance on the word association task was the 
result of you putting a lot of effort into the task? 
8. To what extend do you think your performance on the word association task was the 
result of you not putting very much effort into the task? 
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Attribution Rankings 
Please rank the following factors* in the order in which you think they had an impact on your 
performance on the word association task, from greatest to least. In other words, the factor on top 
should be the one that you think had the biggest effect on your performance, whereas the factor 
on the bottom should be the one that you think had the smallest effect. 
 
*Factors: Luck, Task difficulty, Your ability, Your effort 
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Appendix D 
Intellectual Orientation Inventory: Task Engagement Subscale (Major et al., 1998)  
(Study 1) 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements regarding the word 
association task: 
     
   Strongly disagree                                                                                                  Strongly agree  
 
1                   2                   3                   4                  5                   6                7 
 
  
1. Being good at tasks like this is an important part of who I am. 
2. Doing well on intelligence tasks like this is very important to me. 
3. It doesn’t matter to me one way or the other how well I did on that task.* 
4. This task does not change my opinion of how intelligent I am.* 
5. My performance on this task affected how I feel about myself. 
6. I really don’t care what this task says about my intelligence.* 
 
*Denotes a reverse coded item 
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Appendix E 
Biosocial Model of Challenge and Threat Scale (Blascovich et al., 2001)  
(Study 1 and Study 2) 
Please indicate the extent to which you are feeling each of the following emotions right now: 
     
      Not at all                                                                                                            Very much so 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                  5                   6                7 
 
  
1. Fearful 
2. Worried 
3. Anxious 
4. Eager 
5. Hopeful 
6. Excited 
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Appendix F 
State Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) 
(Study 1 and Study 2) 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements regarding how you 
feel about yourself right now: 
     
      Not at all                                                                                                            Very much so 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                  5                   6                7 
 
 
1. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others. 
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.* 
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.* 
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.* 
9. I certainly feel useless at times.* 
10. At times I think I am no good at all.* 
 
*Denotes a reverse coded item 
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Appendix G 
Group-Threatening Stimulus (Study 2) 
Instructions 
You will now be presented with a brief article summarizing the findings from a recent 
study on political parties and intelligence. Please read the article closely.   
Democratic Participants 
A new study came out recently looking at whether Republicans or Democrats are smarter. 
It showed that Republicans are generally more intelligent than Democrats, and that this holds 
true even after taking race, gender, and other demographic characteristics out of the picture.  
Analysts from an independent research group looked at several waves of participants 
from the General Social Survey. The survey included four separate measures of intelligence. 
Probability knowledge was measured by asking participants to solve basic probability problems. 
Verbal intelligence was measured by asking participants to describe the ways in which various 
items were similar. A vocabulary test was also given. Finally, interviewers rated how well 
participants seemed to understand the questions they were being asked. Political identity was 
measured on an eight-point scale, ranging from strong Republican on one end of the scale to 
strong Democrat on the other end. Those who selected the mid-point of the scale were classified 
as independents.   
The study found that Republicans scored better than Democrats on all four measures of 
intelligence. The gap was largest when comparing strong Republicans to strong Democrats (3-5 
points) and weakest when comparing everyone to the right and everyone to the left of 
independent (1-2.45 points). This study also contained sub-group analyses in which subjects 
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were restricted by race, gender, and age. It was found that regardless of race, gender, or age 
range, Republicans exhibited greater intelligence than Democrats.  
This is consistent with previous research linking liberalism with attributes such as 
simplistic thinking and an overreliance on emotions when making decisions. 
Republican Participants 
A new study came out recently looking at whether Republicans or Democrats are smarter. 
It showed that Democrats are generally more intelligent than Republicans, and that this holds 
true even after taking race, gender, and other demographic characteristics out of the picture.  
Analysts from an independent research group looked at several waves of participants 
from the General Social Survey. The survey included four separate measures of intelligence. 
Probability knowledge was measured by asking participants to solve basic probability problems. 
Verbal intelligence was measured by asking participants to describe the ways in which various 
items were similar. A vocabulary test was also given. Finally, interviewers rated how well 
participants seemed to understand the questions they were being asked. Political identity was 
measured on an eight-point scale, ranging from strong Republican on one end of the scale to 
strong Democrat on the other end. Those who selected the mid-point of the scale were classified 
as independents.   
The study found that Democrats scored better than Republicans on all four measures of 
intelligence. The gap was largest when comparing strong Democrats to strong Republicans (3-5 
points) and weakest when comparing everyone to the left and everyone to the right of 
independent (1-2.45 points). This study also contained sub-group analyses in which subjects 
were restricted by race, gender, and age. It was found that regardless of race, gender, or age 
range, Democrats exhibited greater intelligence than Republicans.  
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This is consistent with previous research linking conservatism with attributes such as 
simplistic thinking and an overreliance on emotions when making decisions. 
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Appendix H 
Anger/Fear/Respect Index (Mackie et al., 2000) 
(Study 2) 
On a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so), please indicate the extent to which you feel the 
following emotions towards [police/law-enforcement officers, gun-rights activists, people on 
welfare, undocumented/illegal immigrants]: 
     
          Not at all                                                                                                         Very much so 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                  5                   6                7 
 
  
1. Angry 
2. Furious 
3. Irritated 
4. Worried 
5. Anxious 
6. Afraid 
7. Fearful 
8. Admiring 
9. Appreciative  
10. Respectful 
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Appendix I 
General Out-Group Evaluations (Voci & Hewstone, 2003) 
(Study 2) 
Generally speaking, how would you rate your attitude towards [police/law-enforcement officers, 
gun-rights activists, people on welfare, undocumented/illegal immigrants]: 
     
              Cold                                                                                                               Warm 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                  5                   6                7 
 
  
1. Cold -- Warm 
2. Negative -- Positive 
3. Hostile -- Friendly 
4. Trusting – Suspicious* 
5. Disgust -- Admiration 
6. Contempt – Respect 
 
*Denotes a reverse-coded item 
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Appendix J 
Behavioral Intentions (Husnu & Crisp, 2010) 
(Study 2) 
On a scale from 1 (highly unlikely) to 7 (highly likely), please indicate the extent to which you 
be willing to do the following things in the near future:  
     
        Highly unlikely                                                                                                  Highly likely 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                  5                   6                7 
 
  
1. Interact with a(n) [police/law-enforcement officer, gun-rights activist, person on 
welfare, undocumented/illegal immigrant]. 
2. Spend time learning more about [police/law-enforcement officers, gun-rights 
activists, people on welfare, undocumented/illegal immigrants]. 
3. Attend a gathering of [police/law-enforcement officers, gun-rights activists, people 
on welfare, undocumented/illegal immigrants]. 
4. Donate money to an advocacy group supporting [police/law-enforcement officers, 
gun-rights activists, people on welfare, undocumented/illegal immigrants]. 
5. Be friends with a(n) [police/law-enforcement officer, gun-rights activist, person on 
welfare, undocumented/illegal immigrant]. 
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